Industrial giants of the Soviet Union

2024 Author: Seth Attwood | [email protected]. Last modified: 2023-12-16 15:55

The USSR was an industrial superpower. Not commercial, not agricultural, but industrial. Industrial giants were the pride of the USSR. Many of them disappeared in the flames of reforms, but there are others that have survived …

I would like to speak about “lost factories”. It is from this point of view to look at the ex-USSR. After all, the USSR was primarily an industrial superpower. Not commercial, not agricultural, but industrial. It is quite logical to look at the basis of his, so to speak, power, that is, at the very industry. And above all, the industrial giants are the pride of the USSR. There were many of them, and each of them was a kind of "state within a state." Many of them disappeared in the flames of reform, but there are others that have survived.

And this is where serious questions arise (based on even a superficial analysis of their activities). They still work today, but as far as profitability and profitability are concerned, here, as they say, not everything is so simple. More specifically, they are constantly working in the red. (I live in the Urals and am familiar with some of these giants.) That is, it is clear that it was difficult to reorganize their work on market lines in a few years. And even in ten years it is not so easy.

But time passes, life does not stand still, the country is developing, and they … are still there. For some reason, these giants (but not only for them) are characterized by low wages for workers and engineers, outdated equipment and constant debts to suppliers. The enterprise is strategic, the enterprise performs an important social function, the enterprise is in dire need of state support … Well, how many times have we heard all this?

State support was provided, for a while the problems were removed, then they again crawled out to the surface. And again beautiful words sounded about the social role of the enterprise, about its rich history, etc. And so on endlessly. By cycle. And here, you know, one most unpleasant question arises: what was the real efficiency of the Soviet industrial system? In the sense of not "coal on the mountain" or "plan for the shaft / shaft according to the plan," but so to speak, what was the financial return from it? Did you steal, you say, a lot? Well, compared to the 90s, not that much. They steal modestly.

The role of thugs in the collapse of socialism is clearly exaggerated. And the bosses behaved quite modestly in comparison with the subsequent period. Then, excuse me, where did it go? … This is not an idle question. Already in the 80s (in the 80s, Karl!), Fellow citizens faced a rather strange paradox: the country is a de facto superpower and controls almost half of the planet, there is no war for a long time, factories operate in every city and town. But there is no happiness in life and goods on the shelves.

There are no more goods, in the sense of the most elementary and primitive. In the 80s, everything was in short supply. And somehow this raises serious doubts about the effectiveness of that very Soviet industrial super-system. I, of course, greatly apologize, but in the same USA, cheap Fords and household appliances (!) Became available to parts of the middle class even before the First World War. Europe, on the other hand, was literally plowed up by the two worlds, but by the 60s and there the car became quite accessible to almost everyone.

And what did we have by the 80s? By car availability?

Here thievish and stupid partocrats like to swear, I somehow do not quite agree with this. The quality of Soviet government (including the income of the ruling class!) Was quite good. But there was no happiness in life, and there were endless queues. By the end of the 80s, the situation had already acquired a frankly idiotic character: the factories were still working "to the fullest" and exceeded, but in stores it was already just a rolling ball.

Exactly so, and nothing else. Then they begin to kick the trade workers: allegedly they were the ones who stole everything. Rather, they were taken away at the prices officially set by the government. The "commercial" activity of commerce was precisely the effect, not the cause. Exactly. Everything is exactly the opposite. Here they begin to swear "international aid". Yes, it took place, they helped. And mostly free of charge. However, the existence of the Soviet bloc had obvious advantages, including economic ones. And factories also operated in the CMEA countries. It was, it was.

You know, just looking at the modern "former Soviet flagships" that are still afloat, a nasty suspicion creeps in about the true economic efficiency of the Soviet industrial system. That is, I'm not talking about the "turnover" (it was simply monstrous!) But about the financial return that it gave, this very industry. It seems to me that the tragedy of the Soviet leaders lay precisely in the fact that they were running a very large, very complex system with very little “surplus product”. And the quality of management was just quite good, and these "guys" not only pushed the speeches from the stands, but also worked.

It's just that even today, after almost 30 years of economic reforms, these former giants are very poorly adapted to the market environment. No way, you know, they can't adapt, they need all the help and they don't pay the bills. How, interestingly, did the "economy" look like, which consisted of such "giants" ("middle peasants")? What could she earn? An interesting "experiment" in this area was carried out after the collapse of the USSR A. G. Lukashenko. He continued to invest in the Soviet giants for 25 years. He did not wait for the return.

Comrades, twenty-five more years! I agree that the experiment is not entirely "clean", but it took place. What has grown has grown. And, for example, “Gomselmash” or “Motovelo” are just “legends” of the Belarusian economy. Amkador, MAZ … He honestly tried to save them and even develop them. Did not work out. Again, if someone is not in the know, then the Chinese industrialization of the 90s was of a rather specific nature: new, namely new factories were built in the southeast of China. And many old enterprises built during the time of Comrade Mao turned out to be simply unnecessary (in particular, northeast China). They refused to fit into the new economy.

That is, the market seemed to suit them, and the money … but not destiny. No, some fit in, and some didn't, although the CCP worked hard. That is, the true commercial value of all these "industry giants" is rather doubtful. It's just that when they were created, the question was not posed in this way and was not considered from this angle: the task was to produce maximum production as quickly as possible. Within the framework of a planned economy, everything could be "profitable", even "oncoming transportation" of similar goods.

It's just that an illusion has a place to be so obsessive: if a gigantic industrial flywheel is spinning, then the return from it must be gigantic. Not a fact, far from a fact. And it seems that in the 70s / 80s the best minds of the Soviet leadership fought over this "mystery of the sphinx": everything works, but there are problems with money and there are no goods on the shelves. Once again: no need to talk about the theft and squalor of the Soviet system. Just the same theft was not so much and the system was quite good for itself.

Profit, of course, cannot be the only criterion in organizing the work of an enterprise, but without it, nowhere. For some reason, in recent decades, the word “profit” has come to be perceived as a kind of “low labor” super profits, which are spent for cynical purposes. But if we argue in a simple way, then profit is what we can take from the enterprise without disrupting its activities. That is, profit is needed not in order to "get rich", but simply because of the economic activity of society - someone has to earn money for it.

So, there are serious doubts that the Soviet industrial system "earned" well. The reason is simple: a constant deficit of everything and everyone in peacetime within the USSR. That is, if it was still possible to employ everyone and give them paychecks, then for some reason it was unrealistic to fill these (very small!) Payoffs with real goods. That is, a logical version arises that it was not so much about the partocrats and department stores, but about the lowest profitability of the Soviet economy. That is, everyone worked, but a rich life did not work. Paradox.

For some reason, the gigantic industrial machine of the Soviet industry could not provide the population with even a basic set of the same manufactured goods (we will quietly keep silent about the products, a separate topic). But why? By the way, an ingenious "solution" to this problem was found just at large industrial enterprises: to "write down" the household expenses of workers in the cost of products (since everything works and the country needs products!) - their houses of culture, rest houses, their own housing construction, their greenhouses and pig farms, their own production of consumer goods.

Lord, all this nonsense … The giant plant was turning into a small state. And in fact, the supply of real benefits to a person from the street and a worker of a large defense plant could be very different. And you could get an apartment quickly, but you could stand in line all your life. But let us ask ourselves, what was the production cost of such an “enterprise”? Taking into account all the "social expenses"? Very bad suspicions creep in … And in terms of the profitability / profitability of his work, too, which is typical.

That is, de facto, in a poor, scarce economy, a large plant further worsened the situation for everyone in general, providing social benefits to its employees. Today we are well aware that a gigantic business (even trading!) Can bring big losses. Today it is no secret to anyone that turnover is one thing, and profit is quite another.

Having dived into the market, the giant factories first threw off the entire "social sphere", loading and overloading local budgets, but they did not become profitable from this (for the most part!). And even the lease of "extra space" helped the business a little. No, if everyone “huddled together” at once, then the fairy tale would be over, but many large Soviet enterprises continued to work and continued to generate losses. At the same time, without already carrying a social burden in the form of various social and cultural facilities and paying workers a meager salary. And generating endless debt.

In Belarus, they were actually allowed not to pay on these debts. As a matter of fact, the Soviet giant factories turned out to be the “white elephants” that killed the Belarusian economy. Well, as the Belarusian leadership reasoned, looking at them: well, such a colossus cannot but bring profit! And for 25 years state subsidies were poured into them, preferential conditions were created and merchants were allowed not to pay debts. "Constellation of black holes" has turned out. They sucked the Belarusian economy to the bottom, after which they quietly "gathered".

It is difficult for an unprepared person to believe in this, but this may well be: a huge system works, works with all its might, works … in the red. And it is impossible to change something. Any attempts at "reforms" first cause small fluctuations, and then the system returns to its initial stable state. Indirectly, one can guess about the "economic buoyancy" of the USSR by talking about the "terrible costs of the 1980 Olympics." Well … as if the USSR was a superpower. And the Olympics were also held by various very average states such as Canada or Italy. This statement sounds somehow strange.

It raises suspicions. Quite a "passing thing". From the same series, the Afghan war and the costs already on it … which supposedly fell "an unbearable burden."Again, the war was not so big and it was not at all near Omsk. And the same Russian Empire waged such wars constantly, without pretending to the loud title of "industrial superpower". The Afghan war is, of course, a big expense, but, again, it depends on who …

The USSR is an industrial superpower with a population of 280 million people … And also the CMEA had a place to be, and the Warsaw bloc. And if such a limited war right next to the border caused such big economic problems, there are serious doubts about the real money earned by the Soviet industry. How stable was the Soviet economy in general (what was its “buoyancy” reserve)? Somehow, against the background of all these "deficits" with relatively small paychecks, it raises the suspicion that the system worked "for itself." That is, the flywheels and gears, of course, were spinning, but it was not so easy to “pick up and spend” something from there.

And then they begin to "kick" the bloated military budget. It is, of course, so. And nevertheless, large defense spending was in many places. By itself, that didn't mean anything. Yes, and the issue of defense capability was not removed from the agenda, that is, in a kind, in an amicable way, the army had to be reduced, like the defense industry, but not military expenditures in general, they could not be squeezed much (it would have smaller size). Such is the paradox: a good modern army is expensive. One gets the impression that the Soviet leaders managed to achieve exactly half of the "miracle of industrialization": they managed to create a powerful working industry, but just did not make it profitable. As a result, Soviet citizens of the late USSR (and foreigners as well) developed a "cognitive dissonance": a super-powerful industrial economy and a rather modest, if not miserable, life.

It couldn't end well. The idea of the article is, of course, not that the economy of a major power should be based solely on kiosks selling shawarma and flower kiosks, as well as travel agencies, but the largest and most interesting enterprise with the most popular products should still "work in a plus". And, quite logically, the larger the enterprise, the more this plus should be. Otherwise, everything is sad (completely sad). I understand that the idea that for a good, rich life it is necessary to earn money for it is more than banal, but for some reason it is very often completely ignored.

It is clear that there are spheres of human activity where money is only spent (science, culture, medicine, education, etc.) But production is exactly the same area where money should not be spent, but … earn, who - what should they, in the end, earn? We still have a problem with this. Just like 30 years ago. It’s still possible to work in factories, but to earn money seriously is not very good. And this despite the fact that, as already mentioned, they threw off the entire "social sphere" a long time ago.

They work either to zero or to a minus, it is quite simple to understand: old buildings that no one has repaired for 40 years, ancient equipment, filthy workers … but they still "rely on and count on". In vain. Absolutely in vain. But more recently, it was from them that most of the then Soviet economy consisted. And very many factories, in fact, were a kind of "magic pumpkin", that is, it was possible to "invest" in them endlessly, but it was already impossible to "take away" something. Then all this was "concealed" by the "common cauldron" of the planned economy, within which they could quite "flourish" for themselves, but left to themselves, many "flagships" and "giants" were thrown ashore. Or eke out a truly miserable existence.

Once again: small salaries and a complete deficit of everything and everyone is not a minor nuisance against the background of general splendor, but a sign of serious problems in building an economic system. Social benefits, you say? But then they were all very different. Access to them. It's just that someone (the most cunning) entered the costs of them into the production cycle itself. Someone just did not really succeed (there was simply nowhere to enter them!). In any case, these very "benefits" were not enough for everyone and not always. The cunning Soviet system of "distribution", queues for everything and coupons is explained by this. After all, the needs of a Soviet man were quite primitive: just shoes, just clothes, just furniture, just cheese, just sausage. No frills. Having in the store one kind of sausage and one kind of cheese, a Soviet person would be happy. But it didn’t grow together, it didn’t "fartanulo".

And the point here was not in the department stores and party organizers, the problem lay deeper. That is, roughly speaking, from the point of view of the author, the Soviet system would be just ideal … if it could still be able to make money. But just with this there were fundamental problems that could not be resolved. And forever “pinching” in endless queues for a completely “finite” sausage (Tanya, don't punch more for sausage!) Or for “imported boots” was not as interesting as it might seem today.

That is, we must pay tribute to the Soviet leaders of the 70s / 80s: they were actively working on the problem. But they failed to solve it. Don't you think that such a global interest in some "petrodollars" is very suspicious for an industrial superpower? Well, they are / are not … after the USA, the USSR at that time was the largest producer of various industrial goods. We are not Saudi Arabia, after all? And not the United Arab Emirates.

But the paradox was precisely in this: oil turned out to be just “heavenly manna”, like gas. Sell raw materials and buy the coveted consumer goods. And nearby industrial giants are buzzing day and night … the picture is truly surreal … That is, in general, we can say that not everything was so simple, so unambiguous with the very "lost" Soviet economy. And it seems that by the end of the 80s it really "went under water", that is, the factories were still working, but any goods from the sale disappeared completely and irrevocably.