Operation "Baikal-79" in Kabul - the triumph of the state security special forces
Operation "Baikal-79" in Kabul - the triumph of the state security special forces

Video: Operation "Baikal-79" in Kabul - the triumph of the state security special forces

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The decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU to send troops to Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 in response to the decision of the NATO bloc, which on the same day approved a plan to deploy new American medium-range missiles Cruz and Pershing-2 in Western Europe. These missiles could strike almost the entire European part of the USSR, and it was clear that with a similar development of events on the southern borders, the Soviet Union was trapped.

Having seized the sole power in Afghanistan, Hafizullah Amin, according to retired colonel Valery Ivanovich Samunin, “was studied by the KGB intelligence long before he became one of the leading leaders of the PDPA. His biography was scrupulously examined. In particular, one vague moment was identified in it: before leaving to study in America, Amin published articles of nationalist and even anti-Soviet content in Kabul newspapers. Judging by these articles, he did not differ in any sympathy for the USSR then. In the United States, he successfully led the community of Afghan students for some time, and then, immediately after the founding congress of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, for some reason without completing his studies, he urgently returned to Afghanistan. In Kabul, he quickly gains confidence in Taraki and becomes the worst enemy of Babrak Karmal, which leads to a split of the PDPA."

According to a veteran of foreign intelligence, Colonel Lev Ivanovich Korolkov, “Operation Baikal-79 was absolutely inevitable. She even, I would say, was late. This was the last day - in a few days there would be practically no people supporting us there. And it would turn out that we attacked a friendly country. The army was subordinate to Yakub, who was married to Amin's sister and was absolutely devoted to him."

- Lev Ivanovich, what could have happened?

- All opponents of Amin and Yakub would already be in Puli-Charkhi - the central prison of Kabul. All these days there were continuous arrests of the supporters of the Parcham party. But the decision to send troops had already been made, and it was impossible to cancel it. Can you imagine what could have happened if Yakub raised the alarm on the units loyal to him? In addition, we knew that Amin's goal was to drag us into the intra-Afghan conflict. In Puli-Charkhi, thousands of Parchamists were shot, I myself was there the next morning after the assault, I was even in the cell where Amin's daughter was sitting.

- And in what capacity were you there?

- I was the head of villa number 2, where 80% of the personnel of the special forces group "Zenith" - special forces of state security, trained at the KUOS in Balashikha to conduct partisan actions behind enemy lines, were based. This was the absolute elite of the KGB, the heirs of OMSBON - the special forces of the NKVD, which during the war years was subordinate to Sudoplatov. A year after the assault, a special-purpose group "Vympel" was formed on a permanent basis on the basis of the KUOS. In addition to the Amin's palace, we had 17 more objects. I coordinated the actions of the Zenith groups. Initially, we were engaged in ensuring the security of the Soviet colony, which numbered more than a thousand people. I have been there since the beginning of September 1979. The task of assault on objects was set about a week before December 27. At the villa, we shared a room with Yakov Semyonov. Then he left for Bagram to put together a group to storm Amin's palace, and Grigory Ivanovich Boyarinov, who arrived, settled in his place - the head of the KUOS, who died during the storming of Amin's palace. By the way, today I am the last senior officer among the teachers of the KUOS - all the others have already left. So we need to have time to finish everything …

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- Lev Ivanovich, how did the events develop around the General Staff?

- The General Staff was the second most important object. It contained the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel Mohammed Yakub. He once "became famous" for his extreme cruelty, personally shooting several hundred people in Jalalabad in the summer of 1979. It was clear that he would not make any compromises. Therefore, a group from Zenit was sent there under the command of Major Valery Rozin, a very calm, thoughtful officer from Kemerovo. Besides him, the group consisted of thirteen Zenit fighters, two border guards and Abdul Vakil. Valery Rozin has already visited the General Staff building, accompanying the permanent representative of the border troops of the KGB of the USSR, Major General Andrei Andreevich Vlasov, and drew up a floor plan of the building. But Yakub apparently received some information and significantly increased the security of the General Staff. Therefore, a legend was developed for the visit of the commander of the arriving 103rd Airborne Division, Major General Ivan Fedorovich Ryabchenko. December 27, at about 19.00, he, adviser to the chief of the General Staff, Major General P. G. Kostenko, General A. A. Vlasov, Colonel Flying, Major Rozin and translator Anatoly Pliev went to Yakub's office. During the conversation, at 19.30 a strong explosion was heard in the city - it was Boris Pleshkunov, a student of the "grandfather of special forces" Ilya Grigorievich Starinov, who blew up the communication well. Yakub rushed to the table, where he had a submachine gun - Rosin in front of him. A hand-to-hand fight ensued, during which Yakub and his assistant were neutralized with the help of a silent PSS pistol, which only Valery Rozin and Yuri Klimov had. But about how it all happened, it is better to ask Klimov himself.

That's exactly what I did. We met with Yuri Borisovich Klimov at the board of the Vympel-Garant Foundation for veterans of special state security units, in which he is the vice president, and I am the head of the information service. Valery Yakovlevich Kudrik, who also took part in the capture of the General Staff, also took part in the meeting.

KlimovThe operation was originally planned for December 14th. Our group left the villa and arrived at the embassy, where we awaited further commands.

KUDRIK Part of the group, including myself, was in Bagram. We lived there in tents and waited for the command to advance to Kabul.

Klimov Suddenly the light went out in the embassy - for some time we sat without light. Then the light was given and we were told that we can return to the villa. It should be added that not long before that, several boxes of machine guns and zinc with cartridges were brought to our villa, and for several nights in a row we sat and equipped stores. We were told that we would be at the facilities, while Amin's opponents from among the Afghans would come to our villa and receive these weapons. But when we returned to the villa, at night they drove trucks, we loaded these weapons there and took them to the embassy. We were told - wait, the start date is postponed. And as I understand it now, it was very good for us. Because at that time there were practically no Soviet troops there. A small breakdown - Afghan troops are raising the alarm, and we have no chance. Moreover, on December 14 we were only allowed to take with us a Makarov pistol, a tear gas grenade and a gas mask. We did not have machine guns and combat grenades. We even guarded the villa ourselves - two people, every two hours a change. And suddenly on December 25, one after another, the Il-76 planes went to land - it could be heard from the sound. Our spirits rose sharply - we realized that we had a cover in the face of the paratroopers.

VEDYAEV When did you arrive in Kabul? I mean the Zenith group.

Klimov We arrived on December 8 and settled in the villa where ours already were. And part of the group, as Valery said, remained in Bagram and waited for the team.

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KUDRIK We were changed into Afghan uniforms and on December 25 we were transported by covered trucks to the embassy, where we were settled in the basement. There were about ten of us. On the morning of December 27, Rozin came to our basement and gave us a task. He showed the plan of the General Staff, divided it into subgroups and determined who should be where. I ended up in a subgroup that was supposed to neutralize a communications center within the General Staff.

Klimov Valery Rozin was from the Kemerovo department of the KGB, I was from Novosibirsk, Valery Kudrik was from Chita. There were also from Omsk and from the Far East - all graduates or students of the KUOS, special reserve of state security. About 6 pm In the evening, the advance to the General Staff in the retinue of General Ryabchenko began. As a newcomer, he was supposed to pay a visit to Colonel Yakub, Chief of the General Staff. There were 13 of us and the translator was Tolya Pliev. With Ryabchenko there was a guard - the Lagovsky brothers, and also General Vlasov.

KUDRIK There were armed guards outside and inside, but they let us through. We went into the foyer, corridors left and right, and a staircase went up. We began to carefully disperse around our points. Volodya Stremilov and I from the Altai KGB Directorate walked to the right and stopped in front of a communications center - there were also two armed guards there. Some of the guys left to the left, and Yura Klimov and Volodya Rumyantsev from the Sakhalin KGB department ascended to the second floor.

Klimov Our goal was the reception area of the Chief of the General Staff. Valery Rozin, as part of his retinue, went to Yakub's office. Rosin and I had a silent PSS pistol.

VEDYAEV Were you tasked with shooting to kill?

Klimov At a meeting with the management, we were told: "You are trained - if anything, take it to the reception." But I said, "If someone twitches, I will shoot."

KUDRIK In addition, we were told that by the time of our visit, the headquarters would have finished work, and there would be no more than ten guards. And he worked! And, as we later calculated, there were more than a hundred servicemen and several ministers in it. And there are only thirteen of us - the generals and even the perfectly trained Lagovskys are not counted, since they apparently did not know about the operation, besides, their task was to ensure the safety of Ryabchenko. Although we were warned - 15 minutes after the start of the operation, the paratroopers should come up and provide us with help. But it turned out differently …

Klimov Analyzing those events over and over again, we asked the same question: why us? You can say as much as you like that we are brave, we were not afraid - but this is a lie. Another thing is that we had not previously participated in military operations, and bullets did not whistle over our heads and grenades did not explode. We knew this only from the movies. And when you experience it yourself, you realize that it will be scary to go the second time. And the first time not, because we did not know what we would have to go through. This was our advantage. It has not yet been written in our subcortex that this is scary and bad, that it is unpleasant.

VEDYAEV What was the signal of attack?

Klimov Explosion of the well outside. Everyone heard him. But a minute passes, then another - and no one starts. Nobody dares. This lasted 3-4 minutes. And apparently they started.

KUDRIK Our machine guns were on safety, and there were no cartridges in the chamber. Therefore, we took turns going into the toilet, sent the cartridge into the chamber and removed it from the safety catch. Ammunition: eight spare horns, four grenades, a pistol and a bayonet knife. Without bulletproof vests, in light sand-colored special forces equipment. When the explosion sounded, we watched the Afghans. They grabbed their weapons. And then the first shot sounded from the side of the entrance. I immediately hit the nearest guard of the communication center with a machine gun and took the machine gun from him. The second rushed into the unit, from where the operators jumped out and grabbed their weapons. As a result of the firefight, the equipment was disabled by us. Some of them were able to jump out through the opposite exit. When it was all over, Stremilov and I gave several more bursts of equipment to exclude the possibility of communication with the barracks located 300 meters away. There was a regiment of guards.

VEDYAEV What did the others do?

KUDRIK At this point, the shooting was going on from the right, and to the left, and above. Fifteen minutes passed - but there were no paratroopers.

Klimov We were warned - Yakub's assistant is a beast, he needs to be neutralized. When we entered, there was a weapon on his table. Therefore, he was immediately neutralized by a shot from a PSS pistol in the head - he fell, and a puddle formed around him. But we were not the murderers - there was still a Hindu doctor.

We didn't shoot him. Although we were taught not to leave witnesses. They shouted to him: “Lie down!”, He fell and covered his head with his hands. I lay there until the very end. Meanwhile, there was shooting below. And suddenly outside from the corridor through the door they hit us from a machine gun. Thank God we weren't standing in front of the door. We immediately threw ourselves on the floor and lay there until the shots through the door stopped. It turned out that it was Vasilyev and Irvanev who had put the sentries in the corridor and some of the bullets had gone in our direction. Irvanev - he himself is from Omsk, we are almost fellow countrymen - then admitted: “I almost put you down” …

VEDYAEV And the grenades?

Klimov There was another room adjoining the reception area. It contained alcohol and something else. When the shooting began, several Afghans hid there. The guys threw two grenades there, explosions thundered - and when a grenade explodes in the next room, the feeling is not pleasant, the air starts to move. When it was over, the Afghans were shouted through an interpreter - they say, come out. They go out - drunk to death. And not a single scratch!

VEDYAEV It's all in the reception area. What happened in the office?

Klimov When the shooting began, Yakub immediately rushed to the table for a machine gun. According to Rozin, the PSS pistol had to be used - it was seen how the jacket on Yakub's back burst. He ran past the table to the chambers, where he often stayed overnight. Then Abdul Vakil, the future foreign minister, who came with us, went there. He said something to Yakub in Pashto and shot him several times with a pistol.

VEDYAEV Were there losses on our side?

Klimov One was shot in the foot. A female doctor came from the embassy - this is who was to be awarded - walked down the corridor despite the shots and provided first aid.

KUDRIK At that moment, the Afghans hiding there from the distant corridor attempted to return the communications center. We were standing in the main corridor just opposite - and Stremilov was shot in the stomach. And he had a pistol tucked into his belt - the bullet strikes right into the pistol and gets stuck in the store. Now this mangled pistol is in the museum of the FSB Directorate for the Altai Territory. After that, at any attempt to enter the communications center, we immediately opened fire. Suddenly the light went out - we pressed ourselves to the floor at the entrance and lay down. They were shooting at any movement with tracer bullets, which got stuck in the walls and glowed for several seconds, which made it possible to assess the situation. After a while, the light came on again.

VEDYAEV Where were the paratroopers?

KUDRIK I checked the time - 45 minutes had already passed. There are no paratroopers. Although we were told that they will be in 15 minutes. The tension rises, and the shooting resumes periodically. Suddenly there was a clatter of caterpillars - paratroopers. We jumped up happily - and they were opening fire on us from large-caliber machine guns.

Klimov I asked Valera Rozin the other day - where was Ryabchenko, did he have a connection with his paratroopers? It turned out that Ryabchenko was sitting in an armchair at Yakub's table. One of the Lagovsky brothers was near him. They had no connection at that moment.

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KUDRIK We were just opposite the main entrance when the paratroopers began to enter. It's good that the light has already been given … The first to run in are two soldiers with wide-open eyes, machine guns at the ready and see us in an unfamiliar form. Stremilov and I are at their best: "Don't shoot, our own people!" And obscenities in pursuit. Thank God none of them had time to pull the trigger. Then the officers entered and the cleaning of the offices began. There is only one tactic - an automatic burst, a grenade, a dash.

VEDYAEV Why did the paratroopers arrive so late?

KUDRIK It was dark and they got lost in the city. So they explained to us later.

VEDYAEV Why did they shoot at the building?

Klimov When they arrived, they saw only a few cars at the entrance. And there was a battle in the building. And they misjudged the situation - in their opinion, a handful of people in cars could not fight against an entire garrison. They decided that it was a setup, a trick - in fact, the Russians are not there. And their task was to take control of the building. And they hit with a heavy machine gun. It's good that not from a cannon …

VEDYAEV How long did the sweep take?

KUDRIK About three o'clock until midnight. Until all the premises have passed. In some rooms, they shot back. Then all the prisoners were brought to the second floor and immobilized, tied with torn sheets instead of ropes that were found here in the building. Rosin went downstairs and said that cars would come for us from the embassy.

Klimov But in fact, we were taken away in the morning, when a government statement was already made on the radio, and Abdul Vakil spoke in front of us.

KUDRIK Our group was taken to the embassy, to their basement. This is a demand for conspiracy - we were all legendary, under false names, and the groups were dispersed. That it was impossible to establish that the forces are accumulating to carry out the operation.

Klimov And we were returned to the villa, the tables were set. But apparently the nervous tension was so strong that vodka was drunk like water. The taste is gone. And you don't get drunk. Then they said - go to bed. You lie down - but the dream does not go.

KUDRIK Only at that moment did we begin to understand what awaited us in case of failure. After all, any breakdown, the Afghans raise the army - and the paratroopers would not have done anything there. All around the mountains, far from the border. Even to Bagram, where the planes were. Nobody would come back.

VEDYAEV What happened next?

KUDRIK On New Year's Eve we were invited to the trade mission, the tables were set. Then new groups were formed. I ended up in the personal protection group of Babrak Karmal. For three months we guarded his residence in the palace of Zahir Shah.

Klimov They promised to reward us with Afghan awards, but they didn’t give us anything.

KUDRIK Of the sixteen people, eight received orders, and eight - just medals. Rozin received the Order of the Red Banner, Klimov - the Red Star. Of course, there was a certain unfairness in the distribution of awards. The whole emphasis was placed on the assault on Amin's palace. But even there, the commander of the Zenit group, Yakov Semyonov, was given only the Red Banner. Three became Heroes of the Soviet Union, one of them - Grigory Ivanovich Boyarinov - posthumously.

Klimov And why was it impossible to simply blast around Amin's palace from a helicopter with a rocket - and that's it, "the main end." But the General Staff decided the fate of the entire operation "Baikal-79", here it was necessary to act surgically, because the army could act at any moment.

VEDYAEV A small breakdown - and the whole operation could collapse.

Klimov When we already analyzed the plan of the operation, it turns out that we did not have any backup options. Even our equipment speaks about it. Everything was done end to end, without overlap. The slightest inconsistency in one link - and everything collapses. Thank God that everything worked out.

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The operation carried out on December 27, 1979 led to a change in the political regime in one of the key states of the Asian region - so that the Americans did not have time to blink. It was the finest hour of the Zenith group - the special forces of the state security of the Soviet Union, with whose veterans and participants in those events we talked today:

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