How Soviet spy Richard Sorge reported military plans from Japan

2024 Author: Seth Attwood | [email protected]. Last modified: 2023-12-16 15:55

A treacherous blow to the back of the Soviet Union, which was defeated by Nazi Germany, was scheduled by the Japanese General Staff for August 29, 1941. But in order to make a final decision on the beginning of hostilities against the USSR, the Japanese leadership tried to find out from the German government the timing of the end of the war.

Part 1. Japanese plan of attack on the USSR "Kantokuen" - "he sees an eye, but a tooth doesn’t."

The Japanese ambassador to Berlin, Hiroshi Oshima, testified after the war: “In July - early August it became known that the rate of advance of the German army had slowed down. Moscow and Leningrad were not captured on schedule. In this regard, I met with Ribbentrop to get clarification. He invited Field Marshal Keitel to a meeting, who said that the slowdown in the advance of the German army was due to the long length of communications, as a result of which the rear units were lagging behind. Therefore, the offensive is delayed by three weeks."

Such an explanation only increased the doubts of the Japanese leadership about Germany's ability to end the war in a short time. The increasing demands of the German leaders to open a "second front" in the east as soon as possible testified to the difficulties. Increasingly, they made it clear to Tokyo that Japan would not be able to reap the rewards of victory if nothing was done to achieve this.

However, the Japanese government continued to declare "the need for a long preparation." In reality, however, in Tokyo they feared a premature action against the USSR. On July 29, the Secret War Diary wrote: “The Soviet-German front is still unchanged. Will the moment for an armed solution to the northern problem come this year? Did Hitler Make a Serious Mistake? The next 10 days of the war should define history. " This meant the time left before Japan made a decision to attack the Soviet Union.

Due to the fact that the "lightning war" of Germany did not take place, the Japanese government began to pay great attention to the assessment of the internal political situation of the USSR. Even before the outbreak of the war, some Japanese experts on the Soviet Union expressed doubts about the swift surrender of the USSR. For example, one of the employees of the Japanese embassy in Moscow, Yoshitani, warned in September 1940: "It is completely absurd to think that Russia will fall apart from the inside when the war starts." On July 22, 1941, Japanese generals were forced to admit in the Secret War Diary: “Exactly a month has passed since the beginning of the war. Although the operations of the German army continue, the Stalinist regime, contrary to expectations, proved to be strong."

By the beginning of August, the 5th Intelligence Department of the General Staff of the Army (intelligence against the USSR) prepared and submitted to the leadership of the War Ministry a document entitled "Assessment of the current situation in the Soviet Union." Although the drafters of the document continued to believe in the ultimate victory of Germany, they could not ignore the reality. The main conclusion of the report stated: “Even if the Red Army leaves Moscow this year, it will not capitulate. Germany's intention to end the decisive battle quickly will not materialize. Further development of the war will not be beneficial for the German side. " Commenting on this conclusion, Japanese researchers point out: “At the beginning of August, the 5th Intelligence Department came to the conclusion that during 1941 the German army would not be able to conquer the Soviet Union, and the prospects for Germany were not the best for the next year either. Everything indicated that the war was dragging on. " Although this report was not decisive in deciding whether to start the war, it nevertheless made the Japanese leadership more soberly assess the prospects for the German-Soviet war and Japan's participation in it. “We must realize the difficulty of assessing the situation,” read one of the entries in the Secret War Diary.

The army at this time continued active preparation for the implementation of the plan of attack and war against the USSR "Kantokuen" ("Special maneuvers of the Kwantung Army"). The General Staff and the War Ministry opposed the provision that the German-Soviet war was dragging on, included in the document of the Japanese Foreign Ministry of August 4, 1941. Chief of General Staff Hajime Sugiyama and Minister of War Hideki Tojo said, “There is a high probability that the war will end with a swift German victory. It will be extremely difficult for the Soviets to continue the war. The assertion that the German-Soviet war is dragging on is a hasty conclusion. " The Japanese military did not want to miss the "golden opportunity" to collapse together with Germany on the Soviet Union and crush it. The leadership of the Kwantung Army was especially impatient. Its commander, Yoshijiro Umezu, conveyed to the center: “An auspicious moment will surely come … Right now, a rare case presented itself, which happens once in a thousand years, for the implementation of state policy towards the Soviet Union. It is necessary to seize on this … If there is an order to start hostilities, I would like the Kwantung Army to be given the command of operations … I repeat once again that the main thing is not to miss the moment to implement the policy of the state. " The command of the Kwantung Army, not wanting to reckon with the real situation, demanded an immediate action from the center. The chief of staff of the Kwantung Army, Lieutenant General Teiichi Yoshimoto, persuaded the chief of the operational directorate of the General Staff, Shinichi Tanaka: “The beginning of the German-Soviet war is an opportunity sent to us from above to resolve the northern problem. It is necessary to discard the theory of "ripe persimmon" and create a favorable moment ourselves … Even if the preparation is insufficient, speaking this fall, you can count on success."

Kwantung Army maneuvers

The Japanese command considered an important condition for entering the war against the USSR to significantly weaken the Soviet troops in the Far East, when it would be possible to fight without encountering much resistance from the Soviet troops. This was the essence of the theory of "ripe persimmon", namely the expectation of "the most favorable moment".

According to the plan of the Japanese General Staff, hostilities against the USSR were to begin subject to the reduction of Soviet divisions in the Far East and Siberia from 30 to 15, and aviation, armored, artillery and other units by two-thirds. However, the scale of the transfer of Soviet troops to the European part of the USSR in the summer of 1941 was far from the expectations of the Japanese command. According to the intelligence department of the Japanese General Staff on July 12, three weeks after the start of the German-Soviet war, only 17 percent of Soviet divisions were transferred from the Far East to the west, and about one third of mechanized units. At the same time, Japanese military intelligence reported that in return for the departing troops, the Far Eastern and Siberian divisions were replenished by conscription among the local population. Particular attention was paid to the fact that mainly the troops of the Trans-Baikal Military District are being transferred to the west, while in the eastern and northern directions the grouping of Soviet troops practically remains the same.

The restraining effect on the decision to start a war against the USSR was exerted by the preservation of a large number of Soviet aviation in the Far East. By mid-July, the Japanese General Staff had information that only 30 Soviet air squadrons had been deployed to the west. Of particular concern was the presence in the eastern regions of the USSR of a significant number of bomber aircraft. It was believed that in the event of an attack by Japan on the Soviet Union, a real danger was created of massive aerial bombardments directly on Japanese territory. The Japanese General Staff had intelligence on the presence in 1941 in the Soviet Far East of 60 heavy bombers, 450 fighters, 60 attack aircraft, 80 long-range bombers, 330 light bombers and 200 naval aircraft.

In one of the documents of the rate of July 26, 1941, it was stated: "In the event of a war with the USSR, as a result of several bombing strikes at night by ten, and in the daytime by twenty or thirty planes, Tokyo can be turned into ashes."

Soviet troops in the Far East and Siberia remained a formidable force capable of giving a decisive rebuff to the Japanese troops. The Japanese command remembered the crushing defeat at Khalkhin Gol, when the imperial army experienced the military might of the Soviet Union on its own experience. The German ambassador to Tokyo, Eugen Ott, reported to the Reich Foreign Minister I. Ribbentrop that Japan's decision to enter the war against the USSR was influenced by "memories of the Nomonkhan (Khalkhin-Gol) events, which are still alive in the memory of the Kwantung Army."

In Tokyo, they understood that it was one thing to strike a blow at a defeated enemy and quite another to engage in battle with a regular army of such a powerful state as the Soviet Union prepared for modern warfare. Assessing the grouping of Soviet troops in the Far East, the newspaper "Khoti" emphasized in the issue of September 29, 1941: "These troops remain absolutely impeccable both in terms of providing them with the latest weapons and in terms of excellent training." On September 4, 1941, another newspaper, Miyako, wrote: “It has not yet come to a fatal blow to the army of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the conclusion that the Soviet Union is strong cannot be considered groundless."

Hitler's promise to seize Moscow with a delay of only three weeks remained unfulfilled, which did not allow the Japanese leadership to start military operations against the Soviet Union on schedule. On the eve of the previously set date for the start of the war, August 28, a pessimistic entry was made in the Secret War Diary: “Even Hitler is mistaken in his assessment of the Soviet Union. Therefore, what can we say about our intelligence department. The war in Germany will continue until the end of the year … What is the future of the empire? The outlook is bleak. Truly, the future cannot be guessed … "On September 3, 1941, at a meeting of the coordination council of the government and the imperial headquarters, the participants in the meeting concluded that" since Japan will not be able to deploy large-scale operations in the north until February, it is necessary to quickly carry out operations in the south during this time. " …

The command of the Japanese army had experience organizing intervention in the Far East and Siberia in 1918-1922, when the Japanese troops, unprepared for warfare in the difficult conditions of the Siberian winter, suffered heavy losses and were unable to carry out major offensive operations. Therefore, in all plans and armed provocations, it proceeded from the need to avoid military operations against the USSR in winter.

Japanese Ambassador to Berlin Oshima explained to the Hitlerite leadership, which more and more insistently demanded that Japan start a war against the USSR: “At this time of the year (that is, autumn and winter - AK), military actions against the Soviet Union can only be undertaken on a small scale. It will probably not be too difficult to occupy the northern (Russian) part of Sakhalin Island. Due to the fact that the Soviet troops suffered heavy losses in the battles with the German troops, they can probably also be pushed back from the border. However, an attack on Vladivostok, as well as any advance in the direction of Lake Baikal at this time of the year, is impossible, and due to the current circumstances it will have to be postponed until spring."

In the document "Program for the implementation of the state policy of the empire", adopted on September 6 at a meeting in the presence of the emperor, it was decided to continue the seizure of the colonial possessions of the Western powers in the south, without stopping before the war with the United States, Great Britain and Holland, for which purpose to complete all military preparations by the end of October … The participants in the meeting expressed a unanimous opinion that "the best moment will never come" to oppose the Americans and the British.

On September 14, the resident of the Soviet military intelligence, Richard Sorge, reported to Moscow: “According to a source of Invest (Hotsumi Ozaki - A. K.), the Japanese government decided not to oppose the USSR this year, but the armed forces will be left in the MChG (Manchukuo) in case of performance in the spring of next year in case of defeat of the USSR by that time."

And this was accurate information, which, after rechecking according to other sources, made it possible to transfer part of the Soviet Far Eastern and Siberian divisions to the west, where they took part in the battle for Moscow.

This was the last encryption of the outstanding Soviet intelligence officer, later Hero of the Soviet Union, Richard Sorge. On October 18, 1941, he was arrested by Japanese counterintelligence.

The carefully prepared Japanese attack on the USSR did not take place in 1941, not as a result of the Japanese government's observance of the neutrality pact, as Japan still claims, but as a result of the failure of the German plan for a "lightning war" and the preservation of reliable USSR defenses in the eastern regions of the country.

An alternative to marching in the north was the outbreak of hostilities against the United States and Great Britain. On December 7, 1941, Japanese armed forces launched surprise attacks on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor and other US and British possessions in the Pacific Ocean and East Asia. The war began in the Pacific.