Table of contents:
- Mikhail Anatolyevich, when you get acquainted with the theme of the Local Cathedral of 1917-1918, a completely surreal feeling arises. Outside the walls of a high church meeting, a revolution is raging, governments and historical epochs are changing, and its participants all sit and sit, deciding issues that, against the background of what is happening, can hardly be called topical. Interestingly, the participants in the council themselves were aware that a few, so to speak, fall out of context?
- But after all, during the events of the February Revolution, the Church took a completely different position
- But since March 3 - with the appointment of a new chief prosecutor, Vladimir Lvov - the Synod was already a part of the new government. How could he have acted differently?
- However, the position of the Church fully corresponded to the public sentiments of that time. Perhaps she was just going with the flow?
- Why did the tsar not please the clergy?
- As far as I understand, according to the Act of Succession to the throne of Paul I, which remained in force until February, the king was the head of the Church?
- Why, having supported the Provisional Government in March, did the Church not lift a finger to help him in the October days?
- Patriarch Tikhon became the head of the Church truly by chance: for both of his rivals who reached the second round of elections, the drawing of lots, more votes were given, as is known. Given the tragic events that soon happened to the country, the Church and the Patriarch himself, this incident is difficult to call happy, but still, how lucky do you think the Church was with Tikhon? How good a patriarch, how adequate was he to the tasks and problems facing the Church at that time?
- I, I confess, was deeply impressed by the story you told in one of your works with reference to the Tobolsk archivist Alexander Petrushin: the Church had a real opportunity to save the royal family in the period of anarchy that followed the overthrow of the Provisional Government, but Tikhon ordered to use the collected for redemption of the Romanovs money for church needs. Are you sure, by the way, of its reliability?
- Maybe they were afraid to intercede?
- A separate topic is Tikhon's activities in the 1920s. There is a legend, which many consider to be a fact: he allegedly commented on the breakthrough of sewage in the Mausoleum with the words: "By relics and oil." According to popular belief, at that time Tikhon was the real spiritual leader of the anti-Bolshevik resistance. How true is it?
- Is it also a myth that Tikhon was poisoned, that he became a victim of the Soviet special services?
- But for what? From the good, as they say, they do not seek good
- As far as I can judge, today the Church does not really like to remember its role in revolutionary events. Do you have the same opinion?
- Have you been betrayed to Anathema yet for your research?
- Is it really so serious?
- Be that as it may, it cannot be said that the Church did not draw conclusions from the events of 100 years ago. Today she takes a very clear political position, does not hesitate in the question of whom to support, the government or the opposition. And the state pays the Church in full reciprocity, practically returning the privileges that it lost a century ago …
- Nevertheless, judging by your speeches, you are not one of those who believe that the "diamond age of the Russian Orthodox Church" will last forever
Video: How the royal power was subjected to the overthrow of the Church
2024 Author: Seth Attwood | [email protected]. Last modified: 2023-12-16 15:55
It was the Church that played a key role in overthrowing the tsarist government as an institution, according to the historian Mikhail Babkin. If it were not for the position of the churchmen, historical events in Russia would have followed a completely different trajectory.
Mikhail Babkin: “They did not consider the Tsar as“their own”, they perceived it as a competitor."
They hardly talk about this - the ROC is extremely irritated by the theme of “Church and Revolution”. Have you heard, for example, that the money, secretly delivered to Tobolsk for the ransom of the royal family, was forbidden to be handed over to the guards by Patriarch Tikhon?
The Russian Orthodox Church very pompously and solemnly celebrated the centenary of the restoration of the patriarchate in the Russian Orthodox Church. Let us recall that the decision on this was made by the Local Council, which met from August 1917 to September 1918. On November 18, 1917, according to the new style, the elections of the patriarch were held at the cathedral, the winner of which was Metropolitan Tikhon (Belavin). On December 4, 1917, he was enthroned. In the jubilee speeches of the church hierarchs, much was said about the sacrifices suffered by the Church during the years of the revolutionary hard times.
But nothing is said about the fact that the Church itself bears a large share of the responsibility for the catastrophe. This gap is filled in an interview with MK by the author of numerous scientific works on the history of the Russian Orthodox Church, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor of the Russian State University for the Humanities Mikhail Babkin.
Mikhail Anatolyevich, when you get acquainted with the theme of the Local Cathedral of 1917-1918, a completely surreal feeling arises. Outside the walls of a high church meeting, a revolution is raging, governments and historical epochs are changing, and its participants all sit and sit, deciding issues that, against the background of what is happening, can hardly be called topical. Interestingly, the participants in the council themselves were aware that a few, so to speak, fall out of context?
- In their memoirs, the members of the council, in particular Nestor (Anisimov) - at that time the bishop of Kamchatka and Peter and Paul, - write that they did not react to the October coup, believing that the Church should not interfere in politics. Let, they say, "the dogs fight", our business is an internal church.
But after all, during the events of the February Revolution, the Church took a completely different position
- I agree that the church hierarchs then took a very active political position. The Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church has taken a whole range of measures to remove the issue of monarchy from the agenda.
As you know, on March 2, 1917 (March 15 according to the new style, hereinafter the dates are given according to the Julian calendar. - "MK") Nicholas II abdicated in favor of his brother Mikhail Alexandrovich. But Mikhail Alexandrovich, contrary to popular belief, did not renounce the throne - he referred the issue of power to the Constituent Assembly for consideration. In his "Act" of March 3, it was said that he was ready to accept power only if "if such is the will of our great people." The rest of the members of the House of Romanov, who, according to the law of succession to the throne of 1797, had the right to the throne, did not renounce it either.
Accordingly, Russia stood on March 3 at a historical fork: to be a monarchy in one form or another - well, it is clear that the more realistic option was a constitutional monarchy - or a republic in one form or another.
But already on March 4, despite the absence of a legal abdication of the throne of the House of Romanov, the Synod began to send telegrams to all dioceses with an order to stop mentioning the names of members of the “reigning house” in divine services. In the past time! Instead, it was ordered to pray for a "faithful Provisional Government." The words "emperor", "empress", "heir to the throne" became forbidden. If one of the priests continued to offer prayers for the Romanovs, the Synod applied disciplinary measures against the violator: the clergy were prohibited from serving or, if they served in the military department, were sent to the front, into the active army.
But since March 3 - with the appointment of a new chief prosecutor, Vladimir Lvov - the Synod was already a part of the new government. How could he have acted differently?
- In the early days of the revolution, the Synod acted absolutely independently. Negotiations between the church hierarchs and the revolutionary authorities - I established this from archival documents - began even before the abdication of Nicholas II, on March 1-2.
And in the future, the relationship between the Provisional Government and the Synod cannot be called a relationship between superiors and subordinates. At the first meeting of the new chief prosecutor with the members of the Synod, held on March 4, a mutual agreement was reached. The Synod promised to legitimize the Provisional Government, to lead the people to an oath of allegiance to it, to issue a number of acts, which, in the opinion of the new government, are necessary to calm the minds. In return, the Provisional Government, through the mouth of the new Chief Prosecutor of the Holy Synod, Vladimir Lvov, promised to grant the Church freedom of self-government and self-regulation. In general, you are for us, we are for you. And on the issue of attitude to the monarchy, the Synod even surpassed the Provisional Government in radicalism.
Kerensky decided to declare Russia a republic only on September 1, 1917. And the Synod, already in the first days of March, ordered the clergy and flock to forget not only about the former emperor, but also about the monarchist alternative as a whole.
This difference in approaches was especially pronounced in the texts of the oaths. In the civil, secular, established by the Provisional Government, it was about loyalty to the Provisional Government "until the establishment of the mode of government by the will of the people through the Constituent Assembly." That is, the question of the form of government was open here.
According to the texts of the church appointing oaths, taken upon initiation into a new dignity, church and clergymen pledged "to be loyal subjects of the God-protected Russian State and in everything according to the law obedient to its Provisional Government." And the point.
However, the position of the Church fully corresponded to the public sentiments of that time. Perhaps she was just going with the flow?
- No, the Church in many ways itself shaped these moods. Its influence on the social and political consciousness of the flock was enormous.
Take, for example, the right-wing, monarchist parties. Before the revolution, they were the most numerous political associations in the country. In Soviet, and in post-Soviet historiography, it was argued that the tsarist regime was so rotten that the monarchy collapsed at the very first impulse. And in support of it, the fate of the right-wing parties was cited, which, they say, simply disappeared after the revolution. They really disappeared from the political scene, but not because of their "rottenness". The programs of all right-wing parties speak of "obedience to the holy Orthodox Church." The Holy Synod, by introducing a ban on the liturgical commemoration of the tsar and the "reigning house", thereby knocked the ideological ground out from under the feet of the monarchists.
How could the right-wing parties agitate for the tsarist power, if the Church forbade even the prayer sound about the tsar? The monarchists really only had to go home. In short, the members of the Synod did not follow the engine of the revolution, but, on the contrary, were one of its locomotives.
It was the Church that played a key role in overthrowing the tsarist government as an institution. If it were not for the position of the members of the Synod, which they took in the March days, historical events would have gone - this is quite obvious - along a different trajectory. By the way, seven of the 11 church hierarchs who were at that time members of the Synod (including the future Patriarch Tikhon) are canonized. Either in the ROC, or in the ROCOR, or both here and there.
Why did the tsar not please the clergy?
“They saw in him a charismatic rival: royal power, like that of the priesthood, had a transcendental, charismatic nature. The emperor, as God's anointed one, had tremendous powers in the sphere of church government.
As far as I understand, according to the Act of Succession to the throne of Paul I, which remained in force until February, the king was the head of the Church?
- Not certainly in that way. The act of Emperor Paul I speaks of this not directly, but in passing, in the form of an explanation: the occupation of the throne was forbidden to a person of a different, non-Orthodox faith, since "the sovereigns of Russia are the essence of the head of the Church." Everything. In fact, the place of the king in the church hierarchy was not clearly defined.
It should be made clear here that priesthood authority is threefold. The first is the power of the sacraments, that is, the performance of church sacraments, the service of the liturgy. The Russian monarchs never claimed this.
The second is the power of teaching, that is, the right to preach from the pulpit. The emperors had the power of teaching, but practically did not use it.
The third component is church governance. And here the emperor had much more power than any of the bishops. And even all the bishops combined. The clergy did not like this categorically. They did not recognize the priestly powers of the monarch, considering him a layman, were dissatisfied with the Tsar's interference in church affairs. And, having waited for an opportune moment, they settled scores with the kingdom.
From a theological point of view, the revolutionary change of power was legitimized by the church in the synodal translation of the Epistle to the Romans by the Apostle Paul, made in the middle of the 19th century. The phrase "there is no power, if not from God" was translated there as "there is no power not from God." Although it literally means: "There is no power, if not from God." If all power is from God, then what happens? That a change in the form of government, a revolution, is also from God.
Why, having supported the Provisional Government in March, did the Church not lift a finger to help him in the October days?
- The October crisis, in a certain sense, played into the hands of the Local Council, which in everyday life was called the "church constituent assembly."
The fact is that since the Church at that time was not separated from the state, all decisions of the council, including the proposal to restore the patriarchate discussed in those days, had to be submitted for approval to the Provisional Government, which remained the supreme power in the country. And it could, in principle, disagree with them. Therefore, the cathedral reacted to the October coup primarily by forcing, accelerating the process of introducing the patriarchate. In the vacuum of power that had arisen, the Church saw an additional chance for itself: the decisions of the council now did not need to be coordinated with anyone. The decision to restore the patriarchate was made on October 28 - just two days after the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks. And a week later, on November 5, a new patriarch was elected. The haste was such that the decree defining the rights and obligations of the patriarch appeared after his enthronement.
In a word, the higher clergy did not even think to support the Provisional Government. Let, they say, there will be any power, if only not royal. No one then believed in the strength of the position of the Bolsheviks, and they themselves did not at all seem at that time to the Church as the devil's incarnation.
About a year after the October coup, Patriarch Tikhon said in one of his messages to his flock (I am transmitting close to the text): "We pinned our hopes on the Soviet regime, but they did not come true." That is, as is clear from this document, there were certain calculations to find a common language with the Bolsheviks.
The church was silent when they seized power, was silent when they began to persecute their political opponents,when the Constituent Assembly was dispersed … The clergy began to raise their voice against the Soviet regime only in response to "hostile" actions towards the Church itself - when they began to take away churches and lands from it, when the murders of clergy began.
- Nevertheless, already in January 1918, in a decree on the decree on the separation of the church from the state, the council directly called for disobedience to the new authorities. However, he continued to work safely. How can you explain such softness of the Bolsheviks? Was it conscious or did they simply not reach the Church then?
- Firstly, the hands really did not reach right away. The main goal of the Bolsheviks in the first weeks and months after the coup was to retain power. All other questions were relegated to the background. Therefore, the Soviet government initially turned a blind eye to the "reactionary clergy".
In addition, in the restoration of the patriarchate, the Bolshevik leadership, apparently, saw for itself certain benefits. It is easier to negotiate with one person, it is easier to press him, if necessary, to the nail than a collective governing body.
According to the well-known apocrypha, which sounded for the first time in the sermon of the Metropolitan of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad Vitaly (Ustinov), Lenin, addressing the clergy in those years, said: “Do you need the Church, do you need a patriarch? Well, you will have a Church, you will have a patriarch. But we will give you the Church, we will give you the patriarch as well”. I looked for confirmation of these words, but did not find it. But in practice, this is what happened in the end.
- The Council met for over a year, the last meeting was held at the end of September 1918, in the midst of the Red Terror. However, it is considered unfinished. According to the Patriarchate, "On September 20, 1918, the work of the Local Council was forcibly interrupted." To what extent is this true?
- Well, what is considered violent? The Zheleznyaki sailors did not come there, they did not disperse anyone. Many questions really remained unresolved - after all, a whole complex of projects for church transformations was being prepared. But in view of the new political realities, it was no longer possible to implement them. Therefore, further discussion was meaningless.
A purely financial problem also arose: the money ran out. The new government did not intend to finance the cathedral, and the previous reserves were exhausted. And the expenses, meanwhile, were quite considerable. To support the cathedral's activities, to accommodate delegates - hotels, business trips … As a result, the participants began to go home - there was no longer a quorum. The mood of those who remained was depressed.
Read the “deeds” of the cathedral, speeches at its last meetings: “we are very few”, “we are sitting without money”, “the authorities are putting obstacles everywhere, taking away premises and property” … The leitmotif was: “We will not sit here anyway” That is, they themselves disbanded - there was no longer any reason to continue working.
Patriarch Tikhon became the head of the Church truly by chance: for both of his rivals who reached the second round of elections, the drawing of lots, more votes were given, as is known. Given the tragic events that soon happened to the country, the Church and the Patriarch himself, this incident is difficult to call happy, but still, how lucky do you think the Church was with Tikhon? How good a patriarch, how adequate was he to the tasks and problems facing the Church at that time?
- A lot of myths are connected with the name of Tikhon. It is believed, for example, that he anathematized the Soviet regime. We are talking about his message dated January 19, 1918. In fact, this appeal did not have a specific addressee, it was formulated in the most general terms. Anathema indulged in those who aspired "to destroy the work of Christ and instead of Christian love sow the seeds of malice, hatred and fratricidal warfare everywhere." Meanwhile, in the arsenal of the Church there were many rather effective methods of influencing the government. Including, for example, an interdict, the prohibition of church requirements until certain conditions are met. Relatively speaking, the priests could stop receiving communion, funeral services, baptizing, and crowning the population until the godless government was overthrown. The patriarch could have introduced an interdict, but he did not. Even then, in the first years of Soviet power, Tikhon was criticized for his unwillingness to toughly oppose the Bolsheviks. His name was decoded as "Quiet he".
I, I confess, was deeply impressed by the story you told in one of your works with reference to the Tobolsk archivist Alexander Petrushin: the Church had a real opportunity to save the royal family in the period of anarchy that followed the overthrow of the Provisional Government, but Tikhon ordered to use the collected for redemption of the Romanovs money for church needs. Are you sure, by the way, of its reliability?
- It was first published in 2003 in the historical journal Rodina, founded by the Administration of the President of Russia and the Government of Russia. And then I myself found this Petrushin. He is a historian by training, but he worked in the KGB, then in the FSB. 10 years since he retired.
According to him, due to his official duties, he was looking for Kolchak's gold in Siberia. Of course, I did not find gold, but while researching local archives I came across many other interesting things. Including this story.
In the 1930s, the NKVD was investigating a case of some kind of counter-revolutionary underground, through which Bishop Irinarkh (Sineokov-Andrievsky) was involved. It was he who told about it. The money in question was intended to protect the royal family in Tobolsk, which consisted of three guards rifle companies - 330 soldiers and 7 officers. In August 1917, they were given a double salary, however, when the government changed, payments stopped.
The guards agreed to transfer the royal family to any authority, to anyone, who would pay off the resulting debt. This became known to the monarchists of Petrograd and Moscow. The money was collected, secretly delivered to Tobolsk and transferred to the local bishop Hermogenes.
But by that time the structure of church government had changed - a patriarch had appeared. And Hermogenes did not dare to act independently, turned to Tikhon for a blessing. Tikhon, on the other hand, made the decision that you have already mentioned - he forbade the use of these values for their original purpose. Where they eventually went is unknown. Neither the NKVD nor the KGB could find any traces. Well, the Romanovs were eventually bought out by the Bolsheviks. In April 1918, a detachment of Red Army men arrived in Tobolsk, led by the authorized Council of People's Commissars Yakovlev, who delivered the delayed salary to the guards. And he took the royal family to Yekaterinburg, to their Calvary.
Strictly speaking, Petrushin's source is not entirely reliable, but I am inclined to trust him, because his story does not in the least contradict the huge mass of documented facts testifying to the negative attitude of the Church and Patriarch Tikhon in particular towards the monarchy and the last Russian emperor.
Suffice it to say that for the entire time of its work, the Local Council made no attempts to help Nicholas II and his family when they were in captivity, never spoke out in their defense. The renounced emperor was remembered only once - when the news of his execution came. And even then they argued for a long time whether or not to serve the requiem. About a third of the participants in the council were against this.
Maybe they were afraid to intercede?
“I don’t think it’s a matter of fear.” The members of the cathedral reacted very violently to the repressions against their colleagues. As they say, they stood up like a mountain to protect them. And the Bolsheviks very much listened to these protests.
For example, when Bishop Nestor (Anisimov) was arrested, a separate session was devoted to this issue. The Council issued a statement expressing "the deepest indignation over the violence against the Church," a delegation was sent to the Bolsheviks with a corresponding petition, in Moscow churches they prayed for the release of Nestor … In general, a whole range of measures. And the bishop was released from prison literally on the second day.
The same thing happened with the arrest of a member of the Provisional Government, Minister of Confessions Kartashev, who was also a member of the council: a special meeting, a petition, and so on. And the same result - the minister was released. And to the arrested anointed of God - the reaction is zero. I explain this by the fact that they did not consider the tsar as "their own", they still perceived him as a charismatic competitor. The confrontation between the priesthood and the kingdom continued.
A separate topic is Tikhon's activities in the 1920s. There is a legend, which many consider to be a fact: he allegedly commented on the breakthrough of sewage in the Mausoleum with the words: "By relics and oil." According to popular belief, at that time Tikhon was the real spiritual leader of the anti-Bolshevik resistance. How true is it?
- As for the statement about the Mausoleum attributed to Tikhon, I think this is really nothing more than a bike. It is not known where he said it, nor when it was said, nor who heard it. There are no sources. The idea of Tikhon as the spiritual leader of anti-Bolshevism is exactly the same myth. You can cite a lot of facts that stand out from this image. In fact, Tikhon was very little interested in what was happening outside the Church. He sought to distance himself from politics.
- There are different opinions about the authenticity of the so-called testament of Tikhon - an appeal published after his death, in which he allegedly calls on the clergy and laity "without fear of sinning against the holy faith to submit to Soviet power not for fear, but for conscience." What is your opinion on this matter?
- I believe that the "will" is genuine. Although church historians are trying to prove the opposite. The fact is that the "will" fits well into the logic of all the previous statements and actions of Tikhon.
It is often claimed that he was right-wing before the revolution. As confirmation, the fact is cited that Tikhon was the honorary chairman of the Yaroslavl branch of the Union of the Russian people. But the monarchists themselves were then indignant that their archpastor in every possible way avoided participating in the activities of the union. On this basis, Tikhon even had a conflict with the Yaroslavl governor, who eventually achieved the transfer of the archbishop to Lithuania.
Another interesting plot: Tikhon has priority in the liturgical commemoration of the Soviet regime. When he was elected to the patriarchate, according to the protocol developed and approved by the Local Council, he offered up a prayer, which included, among other things, the phrase "about our powers." But at that time (November 5, 1917 according to the old style, November 18 according to the new style - "MK"), the Bolsheviks had already been in power for 10 days!
It is also known that Tikhon categorically refused to bless Denikin's army. In general, if we recall and analyze both the above and many other facts of his biography, then there is nothing strange in his call to submit to Soviet power.
Is it also a myth that Tikhon was poisoned, that he became a victim of the Soviet special services?
- No, why not. They could well have poisoned.
But for what? From the good, as they say, they do not seek good
- Well, although Tikhon went to cooperate with the Soviet government, such zeal as Sergius (Stragorodsky) (in 1925-1936, deputy patriarchal locum tenens, then - locum tenens, since September 1943 - Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia. - MK), he still did not show. He was generally a "concrete" cadre of the Cheka-GPU-NKVD and actually included the Church in the structure of the Soviet state. Tikhon, in his own words, obeyed the Soviet regime only for fear. And Sergius - not only for fear, but also for conscience.
As far as I can judge, today the Church does not really like to remember its role in revolutionary events. Do you have the same opinion?
- That's putting it mildly! The topic “Church and Revolution” is simply forbidden in the Russian Orthodox Church today. It lies on the very surface, the source base is huge, but before me, in fact, no one was involved in this. Yes, today there are not many who wish, to put it mildly. In Soviet times, taboos had some reasons, in post-Soviet times others appeared.
I have frequent contact with Church history scholars. There are quite a few secular historians among them, but in most cases they are in one way or another connected with the Russian Orthodox Church. A person, for example, teaches at Moscow State University, but at the same time heads a department at the Orthodox St. Tikhon University. And he will not be able to work there, he will simply be kicked out if he writes his works without looking back at the materials of the bishops' councils, which ranked Tikhon and a number of other bishops of that era as saints.
The dominant version of the history of the ROC today is a purely church version. All church historians and historians close to the Church know and read my works, but there are virtually no references to them. They cannot refute me, they cannot agree with me either. It remains to be hushed up.
Have you been betrayed to Anathema yet for your research?
- No, but I had to receive threats of physical violence from some, let's say, representatives of the clergy. Three times.
Is it really so serious?
- Yes. For several years, I, frankly, walked and thought: will I get hit on the head with an ax today or tomorrow? True, that was quite a long time ago. While they were getting together, I managed to publish everything I wanted, and the motive, I hope, disappeared. But I still periodically hear the question: "How have you not been banged so far ?!"
Be that as it may, it cannot be said that the Church did not draw conclusions from the events of 100 years ago. Today she takes a very clear political position, does not hesitate in the question of whom to support, the government or the opposition. And the state pays the Church in full reciprocity, practically returning the privileges that it lost a century ago …
- The Church is in a much better position than before the February Revolution. The episcopate of the Russian Orthodox Church today is experiencing not even a golden age, but a diamond age, having achieved in the end exactly what it fought for then: status, privileges, subsidies, as under the tsar, but without the tsar. And without any control from the state.
And do not be deceived by the talk about the preference of the monarchy, which is periodically heard in church or near-church circles. The patriarch will never anoint the Russian president for the kingdom, because this will automatically mean giving the anointed one enormous intra-church powers, that is, belittling the power of the patriarch. It was not for this that the clergy overthrew the tsarist government in 1917 in order to restore it 100 years later.
Nevertheless, judging by your speeches, you are not one of those who believe that the "diamond age of the Russian Orthodox Church" will last forever
- Yes, sooner or later, I think the pendulum will go in the opposite direction. This has already happened in our history. In Muscovite Russia, the Church was also plump and plump, growing in riches and lands and living a life parallel to the state. Then many also thought that this would last forever, but then Peter I sat on the throne - and the process turned almost 180 degrees.
The Church will experience something similar in the coming decades. I don't know if this time it will come to the abolition of the patriarchy and the appearance of a synod with the chief prosecutor, or, as in Soviet times, the Council for Religious Affairs, but state control over the Church, primarily financial control, I am sure, will be introduced.
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