The role of the USSR leadership in the NASA lunar scam. Part-2: Do not analyze lunar soil

2024 Author: Seth Attwood | [email protected]. Last modified: 2023-12-16 15:55

According to NASA, astronauts brought from the moon almost 400 kg of lunar soil. But a detailed analysis carried out by Yu. I. Mukhin and many other authors shows that the story with the American "lunar soil" is a continuous chain of doubts, especially when compared with the Soviet lunar soil.

According to NASA, astronauts brought from the moon almost 400 kg of lunar soil. But a detailed analysis carried out by Yu. I. Mukhin and many other authors shows that the story with the American "lunar soil" is a continuous chain of doubts, especially when compared with the Soviet lunar soil.

Those 100 g of lunar soil that Luna-16 delivered could be distributed among hundreds of laboratories. However, he "came to the disposal of a narrow circle (51 groups) practically only of Moscow scientists, mainly from GEOKHI"them. Vernadsky, headed by Academician A. P. Vinogradov.

- ^[3]

a) 1970 - lunar soil from the Sea of Plenty, delivered by Luna-16, montage against the background of clippings from Soviet newspapers.^[31]b) 1972 - the message of "Pravda" about the exchange of soil

Academician A. P. Vinogradov, Vice President of the USSR Academy of Sciences^[32]

As chief editor of the newspaper "Duel" Yu. I. Mukhin on September 10, 2003 turned to GEOKHI with a request to inform:

• a) when and how much lunar soil was sent from the USA to your institute;
• b) in what editions the results of these studies were published and what is the availability of your institute's reports on this topic for review;
• c) who else in the USSR received samples of lunar soil from the USA for research.

- ^[3]

GEOCHI declined to give a written answer to the questions asked

Then Yu. I. Mukhin, who himself has rich practical experience in the field of chemical analysis, studied the collection of articles "Lunar soil from the Sea of Abundance." This book

put in a set in March 1973, that is, three years after the return of "Luna-16" and three months after the flight of the last "Apollo". Out of 93 articles, 51 articles were written by Soviet scientists, 29 by Americans, 11 by French and 2 by Hungarians. If you read one article, then you don't notice anything special … But if you look at all of them, then some thoughts involuntarily arise …. Of the 51 Soviet groups, 46 worked only with Soviet lunar soil.

- ^[3]

And only 5 Soviet groups allegedly investigated American soil. "Allegedly" - because the "lucky ones" do not write what this American soil looks like, while a description of the appearance of the soil is the first thing they write in such articles. The question arises, have they ever seen this American lunar soil? In addition, these articles seem to be "glued" from our own results of Soviet soil research and the sent results of American soil research. First of all, it is striking that the samples of the Soviet and American soil were studied using different methods.

That is, American lunar soil was inaccessible to Soviet scientists.

- ^[3]

American AMS Surveyor gently landed on the moon and broadcast the results of the analysis of the lunar soil by radio^[33]

This is the only official exchange announcement that D. P. Kropotov was found in the main Soviet newspaper Pravda. It is very laconic, although "Lunam", which delivered the Soviet lunar soil to Earth, Soviet newspapers devoted entire pages. Why does the message about the exchange of the literally most precious soil look so modest? Was the exchange a fiction?

A year and a half before Apollo 11, several American Surveyor robotic stations landed on the moon. These stations had devices for (soil) analysis. The Americans could not get the exact content of all the elements, but they got an approximate one.

- ^[3]

Apollo 11 flew more than a year before Luna 16. The Americans did not expect the USSR to be able to deliver the lunar soil so quickly. Therefore, Houston distributed his fake to American and Western laboratories. Without real soil, it is impossible to distinguish a fake.

- ^[3]

When "Luna-16" delivered real lunar soil and many foreign laboratories received it, data soon appeared on the sharp (hundreds of times) differences in the composition of the American "soil" from the real lunar one. Yu. I. Mukhin summarizes the study of the collection:

Soviet lunar soil, came at the disposal of a narrow circle of scientists. They did not investigate the American soil … American and French research groups independent of NASA noted a sharp difference between the soil of "Luna-16" and the American samples in dozens of parameters. Explanation: Americans instead of lunar soil gave samples falsified on Earth.

- ^[3]

American "moonstone" - a petrified piece of wood^[34][35]

These words have recently received an interesting confirmation:

Dutch experts have analyzed the "moonstone" officially, through the Department of State, donated to Prime Minister of the Netherlands Willem Dries by US Ambassador William Middendorf during the visit of the Apollo 11 astronauts to the country - October 9, 1969. After the death of Mr. Driz, the relic, insured for $ 500,000, became an exhibit at the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam. And only now studies of the "moonstone" have shown that the US donation turned out to be a simple fake - a piece of petrified wood.

- ^[36]

And Yu. I. Mukhin ends:

Soviet scientists could clarify. But they were not allowed to do this, limiting their circle and depriving them of the opportunity to conduct a comparative analysis of American and Soviet soil. Then the fact that they are sharply different could no longer be kept secret. And this would raise the question - where did the Americans get their soil? And were they on the moon? The Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU wanted to hide this secret.

- ^[3]

Note

Doctor of Geological and Mineralogical Sciences M. A. Nazarov (photo address lost)

Doctor M. A. Nazarov from GEOKHI, as opposed to Yu. I. Mukhin, claims that "the Americans transferred 29.4 g of lunar regolith from all Apollo expeditions to the USSR, and from our collection of Luna-16, 20 and 24 samples, 30.2 g were issued abroad."^[37][38]Even if this is the case, then these grams correspond to the possibilities of delivering it using automatic stations. After all, three Soviet automatic stations together delivered from the Moon only about 300 g of regolith^[10] and no one says that it was brought by Soviet cosmonauts. And 29 g does not in any way prove the American landings on the moon, as the respected doctor asserts at the end of the article.^[37][38]

An empty Apollo mock-up caught in the Atlantic - a trump card in the Politburo deck (1970)

The capsule is handed over to American sailors and loaded onto an American ship; Photo: Hungarian News Agency, September 8, 1970. First published 1981;^[39][40]

According to NASA, after the flight to the Moon, the Apollo capsules (cabins) with the astronauts on board splashed down in the Pacific Ocean. So that the capsules do not burn out when entering the Earth's atmosphere, they are covered with a layer of thermal protection. And such a capsule, completely empty and without thermal protection, was found in 1970 by Soviet sailors and not in the Pacific Ocean, but in the waters of the Atlantic. A

On September 8, 1970, in the Sovetskaya harbor of Murmansk, the crew of the US icebreaker "Southwind" was solemnly handed over the command module "Apollo", "caught by a Soviet fishing trawler in the Bay of Biscay"! At the same time, Hungarian journalists with cameras appeared in the secret port of Murmansk. The capsule was loaded and Southwind was gone

- ^{[39][41][42][43]}

This was the first call of an American ship into Murmansk since the Second World War, when the USSR and the United States were allies, and a completely unique case in the history of astronautics. True, it is completely impossible to believe in its "accident" - as much as the find is small in comparison with the size of the Atlantic. And why did both main parties and Hungarian witnesses keep silent about this story?

The American icebreaker Southwind, which took on board on September 8, 1970 in the Soviet harbor of Murmansk, the Apollo capsule, which had been found earlier by Soviet sailors; ^[44][45]

None of the reputable space specialists involved in the lunar race. (among them - V. P. Mishin, B. E. Chertok, N. P. Kamanin, K. P. Feoktistov) does not mention the event in Murmansk in his memoirs. It seems that they did not consider it necessary to inform them about the find. Only 11 years after the event, the Hungarian witnesses lifted the veil of silence and published in the book^[39]photographs of the capsule in the port of Murmansk. However, this book did not receive wide popularity, and the event remained practically unknown for a long time. And only recently, thanks to the persistence of the same Hungarians, the story began to gain publicity.^[41][42][43]The author writes:

It all started with the fact that in the name of Mark Wade, the creator of the "Encyclopedia of Cosmonautics"^[41]a letter came from a Hungarian, where he indicated that this absolutely secret photograph was published twenty-five years ago in a Hungarian book.^[39]Perplexed, Wade decided to conduct his own investigation, since neither one of the western sources never mentioned this fact.

- ^[42]

Let us ponder on the unusualness of what happened. The United States is losing a mock-up of a spaceship in the ocean, while the USSR finds it and returns it after a while. And both sides keep this event in deep secrecy. Meanwhile, in Vietnam, Soviet weapons and Soviet troops are opposing US military intervention. There is a cold war, one of the links of which is the lunar race. A tough confrontation between the United States and the USSR is taking place along the entire front of world politics. Is it just all over? A mutual demonstration of power in one place does not exclude simultaneous mutual bargaining somewhere else.

From what we have learned, the following conclusions follow:

1) The skeptics' version^[3][4][5]the existence and operation of some kind of agreement between the USSR and the United States regarding the American lunar program moves from the category of assumptions to the category of established facts, since it is impossible to keep this episode a secret without an agreement between those who have lost and who have found. However, the Americans, having received the capsule without witnesses, could "forget" to pay. Apparently, that is why Hungarian photojournalists were invited to the broadcasting ceremony. At that time, Hungary was an ally of the USSR, and the Hungarians were silent for 11 years.

2) Public notification of this event was fraught with some big trouble for the United States. Most likely, the flight of Apollo 13 could have aroused suspicion. The one on board which the dramatic accident allegedly occurred. This was the only flight to the Moon in 1970. Apollo 13 launched on April 11, ^[46]and after 5 months the Americans returned an empty capsule from Apollo, found by Soviet sailors in the Atlantic. And they found her, as the author believes^[42] in April of that year, the date very closely coincides with the launch date of the A-13. But not in the Bay of Biscay, and not fishermen, but Soviet military men in the framework of a special operation. The same author directly connects the found capsule with the flight of Apollo 13. All this is written in detail in, ^[47] where is the author's version^[42] developed in the direction that it was this empty mock-up that stood on top of the rocket supposedly launched to the moon under the number "Apollo 13".

To cancel the landing of Soviet cosmonauts. Lunar rocket H1 close to success - close! (1974)

Н1 at the start.^[48] Inserts - rocket R7 ("Vostok", "Voskhod")^[49] Academician V. P. Mishin^[50]

Although in 1970 the Politburo canceled the flyby of the Moon, the task of landing an astronaut on the Moon has not yet been removed, and the development of the Soviet H1 lunar rocket continued for this task (Fig. 19). This meant the threat of a "lunar" counteroffensive by the USSR. But in 1974-76. and this work was stopped, ostensibly due to lack of success. Meanwhile, the study of historical materials reveals a different picture.^[51]

Half a step to win and two years to prepare

The giant N1 rocket was the brainchild of S. P. Queen. After his death, the work was supervised by his successor as academician V. P. Mishin (ill. 19). The height of the rocket was 105 m, its mass was about 3000 tons, and the payload was ~ 90-100 tons.^[5]

The lunar complex N1-L3 was created not as an analogue of spent launch vehicles, but as a colossal step forward. The N-1 in terms of its launch weight was an order of magnitude larger than the remarkable Vostok launch vehicle

- ^[52]

From the very beginning, 6 tests of the H1 were planned … Note that the incomparably simpler first Soviet intercontinental missile R-7 ("Vostok") flew only from the fourth launch.^[6]From 1969 to 1972, four tests of the H1 were carried out. All of them ended in accidents, but step by step significant progress was made in the work on the rocket. During the fourth test, the first stage worked 95% of its time.before pump # 4 exploded. Had the "evil spirits" delayed for another 7 seconds with this pump, and the first step, to the delight of its creators and the chagrin of the Americans, would have worked everything it should.

The head of the tests, B. E. Devil. So I wanted complete success. And yet,

the designer and all the services of the cosmodrome were incredibly happy. It was clear - half a step to victory.

- ^[6]

After all, there were still two trials. And new and very reliable engines are already ready. "Even the most cautious minds cited 1976 as the deadline for the new car to be fully debugged."^[6]

The Politburo, however, had other plans.

Cancel the approved test program, destroy all ready-made missiles

Chief Designer, Academician V. P. Glushko - the main "executor" of the closure of the H1 project^[53]

Almost 2 years have passed since the fourth test in hard work. B. E. Chertok writes about this period as follows:

In 1974, it was not too late to take revenge in the moon race. The start-up of H1 No. 8 with new engines was being prepared. I am sure: after one or two launches, the rocket will start flying. Then in three or four years we are able to carry out a lunar expedition and create a lunar base. Interplanetary and other not so fantastic prospects are (connected) with H1 … Thus, we will bypass the Americans. We are capable of much more.

- ^{[54][55][56][57]}

And so, in the middle of this very 1974, when everything is ready for testing a new rocket with new engines, V. P. Mishin was removed from the leadership of the "royal firm", and in his place was appointed a longtime rival of the late Korolev - V. P. Glushko. Prepared tests are canceled.

… Why was it necessary to prohibit the launches of two practically assembled missiles? Their launch did not interfere with work on new topics; they began more than two years later. And the experience of launching these two missiles would provide valuable material. It was difficult to explain the decision to destroy the reserve for seven sets of launch vehicles to those specialists whose labor they were created

- V. P. is perplexed. Mishin.^[6]

If the reason for the closure were the dissatisfaction of the Politburo with the technical side of the issue, then it would be logical to expect closure immediately after the fourth test in 1972. But people were given almost two more years to finalize the rocket. And they did their best. The only thing that could destroy confidence in success was new launches, if they were unsuccessful. But they were not allowed. So it's not about technology. And not in the lack of money, because two years later a three times more expensive project of a new rocket with the same parameters (Energia) was launched from scratch. Glushko, forbidding trials,

knew what we, the participants in this work, did not know then, - so writes B. E. Devil.^{[54][55][56][57]}

D. F. Ustinov - Secretary of the Central Committee for the defense industry, candidate member of the Politburo, since 1976 - member of the Politburo and Minister of Defense of the USSR^[58]

Professor Yu. A. Mozzhorin, director of the head institute, who spoke out against the previously announced political verdict^[59]

Early 1974 Ustinov gathered close people to decide the fate of N1 … It was necessary to prepare a verdict, which should be reported to the Politburo, and then formalized by a resolution. None of the creators of H1 was invited. Pilyugin, the closest chief designer to Ustinov in those years, could destroy the alleged unity (and was not invited either).

- ^{[54][55][56][57]}

In his opening remarks, Dmitry Fedorovich noted that the lunar program had failed., the reason is the unreliability of the Kuznetsov engine, it's time to come up with a proposal to the Politburo to close the program. And now listen to the point of view of the head institute, - he finished

I felt very embarrassed, since the opinion of the Secretary of the Central Committee had already been stated. He described the significance of Russian studies of the Moon with the help of automatic devices. Therefore, the significance of our lunar (manned) expedition has disappeared. Refusal from it should not be accompanied by the termination of the development of H1. The question of the engine's lack of work has been removed. The development of space technology leads to a sharp increase in the mass of space objects. So the need for super-heavy vehicles will not disappear with the closure of the lunar program. Closing H1 will throw us far back …

I ended up in the singular. In conclusion, Ustinov instructed to prepare a draft report to the Politburo. While I was sitting in my office, pondering the situation, (Minister) Afanasyev called: - You spoke remarkably and convincingly. Keep working! I can only explain the unexpected reaction of Sergei Aleksandrovich. He didn't want to close the program. However, Afanasyev saw that resisting such a decision is simply dangerous … Therefore, my brave speech, in spite of the pressure of the Secretary of the Central Committee, could not fail to give the minister satisfaction."

- ^[60]

And two years later, another participant in the meeting (B. A. Komissarov) said to Mozzhorin:

And you were right in opposing the closure of H1. We made a mistake.

So, who praised the brave Mozzhorin immediately after the meeting, who after two years. And from the very beginning of the meeting, its participants realized from Ustinov's words - the verdict N1 has already been passed to the Politburo and will not lie on appeal … And the technical details here are just a decoration of the already adopted political decision.

With the very procedure of closing the project, the Politburo was a little "pulled". If the first order was issued by Glushko in 1974, then the entire project was finally closed only in 1976.^[5]Such a comparison suggests itself. Imagine that in a high-profile negotiation, one side committed itself to ending the production of some type of missile. And she stopped. But the plant for the production of this rocket has been preserved. And the design bureau with him left everything, everything else, which made it possible at any time to resume the just stopped production. Would a negotiating partner be concerned about this? Indisputably. The unclosed plant (in this case, the unclosed H1 project) made the partner nervous. And if so, then you can get additional payment for the final solution of the issue.