Why did the Nazis harbor illusions that they would defeat the USSR in 2 months?

2024 Author: Seth Attwood | [email protected]. Last modified: 2023-12-16 15:55

The Second World War became the largest armed conflict, the most dramatic and darkest page in human history. It is generally accepted that the epochal conflict, which, in fact, became a continuation of the First World War, began on September 1, 1939. The most important stage of the Second World War began on June 22, 1941, when Germany launched a treacherous attack on the Soviet Union. The Nazis hoped that they would be able to crush the country of the Soviets in just 2 months.

June 23, 1941 US Secretary of War Henry Lewis Stimson provides President Franklin Roosevelt with a report on the situation in the USSR. According to American intelligence and the German military headquarters, it will take about 6 weeks to completely break the resistance of the Red Army. On June 30, the next issue of the weekly American magazine "Time" was released. His main article was the material with the headline: "How long will Russia last?" The article contained the following words: “The question of whether the battle for Russia will become the most important battle in the history of mankind is not decided by German soldiers. The answer to it depends on the Russians."

An interesting fact: why did Germany need a war?

For the most part, the German leadership and the army command understood that they would not be able to wage a protracted war with the Soviet Union. Four factors indicated the inevitability of German defeat in a prolonged war. The first - the USSR at the time of 1941 had a development and a powerful industry. Second, the reserves of natural resources in the USSR were much higher than in Germany and the Axis countries. Third, the USSR did not have those logistical problems in the transportation of resources that Germany had. Fourth, the mobilization resource of the USSR (both military and labor) was much higher than that of Germany, and moreover, comparable to the mobilization resource of the entire Axis.

Nevertheless, the German leadership had a number of ideological prejudices and stereotypes regarding the USSR. For example, the German leadership really believed that the Soviet population was under the yoke of the Bolshevik regime and would be happy about "liberation."

Based on all this, in 1940-1941, the German command created the "Barbarossa" plan, which proposed a project for a lightning strike against the USSR, an offensive in several directions and the use of the tactics and strategy of "Lightning War". At the time of the spring of 1941, the German command set aside the Red Army only 2 months for resistance. So what were the reasons that allowed the Germans to hope for such a rosy outcome of the campaign?

First- numerical superiority in manpower: for an attack on the USSR, Germany and its allies concentrated more than 4 million people in the eastern direction against 3.3 million people (including a reserve of 6 thousand).

And what is the bottom line: the numerical superiority of the Wehrmacht really helped the Germans in the first stage of the war.

Second - strategic position: two large groupings of Soviet troops were located near Bialystok and Lvov, thus finding themselves in fact surrounded by the enemy even before the start of the war.

And what is the bottom line: it really was a mistake of the Soviet command. Two large groupings of troops were defeated in the very first weeks of the war.

Third - sabotage and sabotage: even before June 22, a large number of saboteurs from the Axis countries were thrown deep into Soviet territory, few people know, but near Leningrad (including) Finnish saboteurs were active (it is not customary to remember such pages of the war since the USSR, since after 1944 Finland was an ally).

And what is the bottom line: sabotage and sabotage really took place and had a strong impact on the situation in the Red Army in the first two weeks, while many operations were still prevented by the NKVD troops.

Fourth - the stake on the nationalist movement: before the start of the Great Patriotic War, the USSR returned the territories of western Ukraine and Belarus to the respective republics (the Ukrainian SSR and the BSSR), and also carried out the annexation of the Baltic countries in order to increase its security before the approaching war. In turn, the German leadership relied on the fact that the local population would rebel against the Soviet regime, which would facilitate the advance of the Wehrmacht.

Moreover, since the 1930s, German intelligence, along with Polish intelligence, actively supported nationalist groups and parties on the territory of Ukraine and Belarus, and also did not do everything to present the USSR as an enemy in the eyes of the Baltic states.

And what is the bottom line: collaboration on Soviet territory was not uncommon, but not nearly as widespread as the Germans had hoped. Many units of "collaborationists" at the first opportunity fled back to the Soviet side, surrendering. In addition, a partisan and underground movement immediately emerged in the occupied territory, which was very often supervised by the NKVD officers, officers of the Red Army and party leaders.

The resistance of the Red Army turned out to be much more organized and desperate. youtube.com.

Fifth - ideological delusions: the German leadership mistakenly believed that the population of the USSR, for the most part, had a negative attitude towards the power of the Bolsheviks and would also begin to rebel after the start of the war. In addition, the Germans misjudged the atmosphere among the top leadership of the USSR, believing that after the first military failures, a coup d'etat would take place in the country of the Soviets.

And what is the bottom line: in Germany, the social situation within the USSR was absolutely inadequate. The majority of the population supported the current government. It should be noted that the infamous Great Terror of the 1930s saved much of the uprisings in the rear of the USSR. However, this is a separate big topic for conversation.

Sixth - stake on lightning war: the USSR had to be defeated quickly. Blitzkrieg's tactics and strategy generally made it possible to pull off such a trick. The calculation was made on the complete defeat of the Red Army until the moment the Soviet Union re-mobilized, as well as on the destruction of most of the industry, which was concentrated in the western part of the state.

And what is the bottom line: in the first weeks, the speed of advance of German troops reached a staggering 15-30 km inland. Nevertheless, despite the large number of "boilers" and the defeat of the Red Army in the early days, the German command overestimated its forces within the framework of the Barbarossa plan. The steadfastness, despair and organization of the resistance of the Red Army turned out to be much higher than the Germans believed.

As a result, having overestimated its strength and underestimating the strength of the Soviet Union, Germany stepped on the same rake, which she knew very well even before the start of the war. The dramatic and selfless resistance of the Red Army made it possible for the USSR to carry out a total mobilization, to evacuate a significant part of the industry, to redeploy veteran army formations from the Far East. The victims of the first months of the war forged a future victory, and also made it possible to strengthen the position of the USSR in the anti-Hitler coalition, turning the country of the Soviets from a “temporary ally” of the Western countries in this war into the main one. The battle for Moscow and Leningrad will become the apotheosis of the first stage of the Great Patriotic War. But that is another story.