Documentary collection "The Sorge Case" exposes Khrushchev's insinuations

2024 Author: Seth Attwood | [email protected]. Last modified: 2023-12-16 15:55

The tragic for our people date of the attack on the USSR by Hitlerite Germany on June 22 has come, the beginning of a bloody massacre unprecedented in history, which claimed about 27 million lives of Soviet people.

Knowing that in my scientific and journalistic works, while exploring the pre-war situation in the world, including in the Far East, I widely refer to the information that came to Moscow from the resident of the Soviet military intelligence Richard Sorge, my readers have been asking the same question. Namely: “Why, having detailed information about Hitler's plans for our country, Stalin did not use it properly, and the German attack took him by surprise? After all, if you believe the literature about Sorge, this outstanding intelligence officer informed in advance not only the exact date of the attack, but also the composition of the German group allocated for the war against the USSR, and even the direction of the main strikes? " To this can be added the "information" that appeared recently in the TV movie about Sorge that our intelligence officer in Japan allegedly sent to Moscow from Tokyo … and the very plan of war between Germany and the Soviet Union "Barbarossa".

Getting to the answer to this question that still excites people, I note that one should pay special attention to his first words, namely, "if you believe the literature about Sorge." The fact of the matter is that not all "literature about Sorge" can be trusted. For during the disclosure of the exploits of the outstanding intelligence officer during the reign of the USSR Nikita Khrushchev, not without the direct participation of this figure, a legend was created, or rather a myth that deliberately distorted reality about the alleged complete disclosure of the plans and plans of Hitler and his generals regarding the defeat of the Soviet Union in a lightning war. Until the date of the beginning of the treacherous invasion - Sunday morning June 22, 1941. This was done by the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Khrushchev, who hated J. V. Stalin, to create among the people about the leader of the country during the war years as a gloomy misanthrope who did not believe in anyone or anything, through whose fault the Nazi troops, inflicting powerful blows on the poorly prepared and taken by surprise by the Red Army, they reached the walls of Moscow.

And only in the post-Khrushchev period, Soviet, and now Russian researchers, as well as Japanese Zorgevologists, based not on inventions, but on genuine documents, were able to give a real picture of what the Soviet intelligence officer actually managed to find out in Tokyo and transmit to Moscow about the German attack on the USSR … Of course, there were no reports attributed to Sorge about the German attack "at dawn on June 22", of course, and could not have been, because Hitler, for reasons of surprise, would not have reported the date to his ambassador in faraway Tokyo, through which our intelligence officer received important information … However, Sorge's warnings about the imminent treacherous invasion of the Soviet Union by the Wehrmacht were substantiated and confirmed by other sources. And, of course, they were taken into account, although they were thoroughly checked for the possibility of the enemy's disinformation activities.

One of the editions, which contains genuine encryptions to Sorge about the danger of war, is the 18th volume from the series “Russian Archive”, published in 1997 - “The Great Patriotic War. The Soviet-Japanese War of 1945: the history of the military-political confrontation between the two powers in the 30s - 40s. Documents and materials ". Sorge's messages contained in this collection helped the author of these lines to a large extent in preparing the monograph "The Japanese Front of Marshal Stalin" (2004), which, among other things, examines the role of Soviet intelligence in defining the Soviet leadership's policy and strategy towards Japan in the first period of the Great Patriotic War. …

This year, another collection has appeared in our country, which contains almost all the documentary materials available today concerning the intelligence activities of Richard Sorge in China and Japan. The monograph was compiled by the Russian scientist in Japan, Candidate of Historical Sciences Andrei Fesyun and is entitled "The Case of Sorge". Telegrams and Letters (1930 - 1945) ". For those who study the activities of the Soviet intelligence officer and who are simply interested in his exploit of the readers, this is an important additional help, which allows not according to rumors and speculation, sometimes malicious, but on genuine original documents to form an idea of the intelligence activities of the great anti-fascist and pay tribute to him. The activity is highly challenging and life-threatening.

So, what did Sorge and his group manage to transfer from Tokyo to the intelligence directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army about the approaching attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union, and through the General Staff to the country's top leadership, including J. V. Stalin?

From the collection we learn that the first serious information on this matter came from Sorge on April 11, 1941. The resident of the Soviet military intelligence Ramsay (Richard Sorge) reported:

“I learned the following about the delicate German-Soviet relations: a deputy came to Himmler's man, by the name of Huber, who works at the German embassy in Tokyo, who told Huber to leave for Germany immediately, since the new man believes that the war is between the USSR and Germany can begin at any time after the return of Matsuoka (Japanese Foreign Minister - A. K.) to Tokyo.

The German naval attaché informed me that he had unexpectedly received an order to send raw materials not through Siberia, but on steamers operating in the South Pacific as raiders. But this was later abandoned, and he believes that tensions between Germany and the Soviet Union have eased.

The German embassy has received a telegram from Ribbentrop, which states that Germany will not start a war against the USSR unless it is provoked by the Soviet Union. But if it turns out to be provoked, then the war will be short and end in a cruel defeat for the USSR. The German General Staff has completed all the training.

In the circles of Himmler and the General Staff, there is a strong trend in favor of starting a war against the USSR, but this trend does not yet prevail.

Ramsay.

Recall that Hitler made the final decision to conduct a war against the USSR by the beginning of August 1940. “Russia must be liquidated. The deadline is the spring of 1941, said the Fuehrer on July 31, 1940 at a meeting of the leadership of the German armed forces. To achieve a surprise attack, a whole program of misinformation was developed, misleading the enemy about Berlin's intentions and the timing of a possible war, which explained the inconsistency of intelligence reports to the Kremlin from various countries, including Japan.

Although the Soviet-Japanese pact of neutrality was signed in Moscow on April 13, 1941, there was no confidence in the Kremlin that the Japanese leadership would abide by it in the event of an attack by its ally Germany on the USSR. On April 16, the chief of intelligence of the General Staff of the Red Army sets the task for Sorge:

“In connection with the conclusion of a neutrality pact between the USSR and Japan, follow the foreign policy course and military measures of the Japanese government and command. Please provide specific measures for the expansion of Japan to the South and for the end of the war with China. Public opinion in Japan. Japan's relationship with the United States and England.

What do you know about the loading of Japanese units on ships in Shibaura? I am waiting for your information. D..

It is quite obvious that the Kremlin had a certain expectation that Tokyo, having a pact of neutrality with the USSR, would, with greater freedom of action, focus its military efforts on ending the war in China and confronting the Anglo-Saxon states. And at least at first, it will not allow provocations fraught with a big war on the Soviet-Manchu border.

Regarding the reaction in Tokyo to the conclusion of the neutrality pact, Sorge reported on April 16:

“Otto (Ozaki Hotsumi - AK) visited Konoe when the latter received a telegram from Matsuoka regarding the conclusion of a neutrality pact. Everyone present, including Konoe, was overjoyed at the pact. Konoe immediately called War Minister Tojo, who expressed no surprise, joy or anger, but agreed with Konoe's opinion that neither the army, navy, nor the Kwantung army should publish any statement regarding the new pact.

During the discussion of the issue of the consequences of the pact, the issue of Singapore was not even raised.

The main attention of all those present was focused on the question of how to use the pact to end the war in China. If Chiang Kai-shek continues to rely on America, then it would be useful to turn again to America with a proposal to reach a friendly understanding with Japan regarding China.

Otto believes that the above points will form the basis of Japan's future foreign policy.

Konoe told Otto that he believed that there was a clash in Berlin between Matsuoka and Oshima (Japanese ambassador to Germany - A. K.), as Oshima had sent a telegram expressing dissatisfaction with Matsuoka's behavior in Berlin.

When Otto subsequently asked Konoe directly about Singapore, Konoe replied that the German ambassador and other people were very interested in this issue.

Be that as it may, Otto believes that if England suffers further defeats, as now, then the question of attacking Singapore will again arise very urgently, and if not now, then after a while.

Ramsay.

Let us add that - unlike politicians - Japanese military circles, which had a negative attitude to any agreements with the Soviet Union, did not attach much importance to the neutrality pact. In the "Secret War Diary" of the General Staff of the Army on April 14, the following entry was made: “The significance of this treaty is not to ensure an armed uprising in the south. It is not a treaty and a means to avoid war with the United States. It only gives additional time to make an independent decision to start a war against the Soviets."

Realizing the strategic importance of the "switching" of Japanese aggression from the north to the south, who had the opportunity to influence Japanese policy and strategy through Ozaki, a member of his reconnaissance group close to the Prime Minister, Zorge proposed to "push" the Japanese towards expansion in the south, which objectively made it difficult to simultaneously act in the north, against the USSR. On April 18, 1941, he writes to the Center:

“Otto has some influence on Konoe and others, and he can raise the issue of Singapore as an acute issue. Therefore, I ask you whether you are interested in pushing Japan to oppose Singapore or not.

I have some influence on the German ambassador Otto and can or may not encourage him to put pressure on Japan in the issue of her action against Singapore.

If you are interested, please give me directions as soon as possible regarding your wishes.

Ramsay.

One can only be perplexed that the Center rejected this proposal of Sorge. By the way, this once again refutes the absurd fabrications spread in the Russian media in the 1990s that the alleged Japanese-American war … was "organized" by Stalin and his special services. The encrypted message to Sorge from Moscow read:

“Your main task is to promptly and reliably report on all the specific measures of the Japanese government and command in connection with the conclusion of the pact with the USSR, what exactly they are doing to redeploy troops, where and which units are being transferred and where they are concentrated.

Influencing and pushing Konoe and other influential persons is not your task, and you should not do it."

Sorge sent the following important information about the approaching German attack on the USSR to Moscow on May 2, 1941:

“I talked with the German ambassador Otto and the naval attaché about the relationship between Germany and the USSR. Otto told me that Hitler was determined to crush the USSR and get the European part of the Soviet Union into his own hands as a grain and raw material base for German control over all of Europe.

Both the ambassador and the attaché agreed that after the defeat of Yugoslavia in relations between Germany and the USSR, two critical dates are approaching.

The first date is the time of the end of sowing in the USSR. After the end of the sowing, the war against the USSR can begin at any moment, so that Germany will only have to reap the harvest.

The second critical moment is the negotiations between Germany and Turkey. If the USSR creates any difficulties in the issue of Turkey's acceptance of the German demands, then the war will be inevitable.

The possibility of a war breaking out at any moment is very high, because Hitler and his generals are confident that a war with the USSR will not in the least interfere with the conduct of a war against England.

German generals rate the Red Army's combat effectiveness so low that they believe that the Red Army will be defeated within a few weeks. They believe that the defense system on the German-Soviet border is extremely weak.

The decision to start a war against the USSR will be made only by Hitler, either already in May, or after the war with England …

Ramsay.

As can be seen from this report, the possibility of the outbreak of hostilities against the USSR "after the war with England" was admitted. Was it possible to draw final conclusions on the basis of such mutually exclusive information? Of course not! However, was there any "fault" in this for Sorge? Again, no. As befits a serious intelligence officer, he passed on all the information he obtained, including contradictory ones. The conclusions were to be made in Moscow.

However, conclusions were extremely difficult to draw. Indeed, intelligence reports, in particular from the Soviet intelligence network in Europe "Red Chapel", contained a number of dates for the upcoming German attack on the USSR: April 15, May 1, May 20, etc. There are many reasons to believe that these dates were launched for the purpose of disinformation by the German special services. It seems that in Berlin they acted according to the famous parable of the shepherd boy who, out of prank, often shouted: "Wolves, wolves!" They hurried to his aid, but there were no wolves. When the wolves really attacked, the adults, thinking that the boy was playing around again, did not rush to the rescue.

Subsequent reports from Sorge about the timing of Germany's attack on the USSR were also not clear. It was assumed that the war might not start. Here is a transcript from Tokyo on May 19, 1941:

“The new German representatives, who have arrived here from Berlin, declare that the war between Germany and the USSR may begin at the end of May, since they received an order to return to Berlin by that time.

But they also said that this year, too, the danger may pass.

They declared that Germany had 9 army corps, consisting of 150 divisions, against the USSR. One army corps is under the command of the famous Reichenau. The strategic scheme of the attack on the Soviet Union will be taken from the experience of the war against Poland.

Ramsay.

On the same day, Sorge reports:

“… Otto learned that in the event of a German-Soviet war, Japan would remain neutral for at least the first weeks. But in the event of the defeat of the USSR, Japan will begin military operations against Vladivostok.

Japan and the German BAT (military attaché - A. K.) are monitoring the transfer of Soviet troops from east to west.

Ramsay.

On May 30, Sorge transmitted:

“Berlin informed Otto that the German offensive against the USSR would begin in the second half of June. Otto is 95% sure that the war will start … Reasons for the German action: the existence of a powerful Red Army does not give Germany the opportunity to expand the war in Africa, because Germany must keep a large army in Eastern Europe. In order to completely eliminate any danger from the USSR, the Red Army must be driven away as soon as possible. Otto said so.

Ramsay.

Sorge's message about Berlin informing its ambassador to Japan about the time of the attack on the USSR raises certain doubts. Hitler, having strictly forbidden to inform the Japanese of anything about the "Barbarossa" plan, could hardly entrust his diplomats in Tokyo with extremely important information without fear of its leakage. Hitler concealed the date of the attack on the USSR even from his closest ally, Mussolini. The latter learned about the invasion of German troops into the territory of the USSR only in the morning of June 22, while still in bed.

Although Sorge's message about the likelihood of a German offensive "in the second half of June" was correct, could the Kremlin fully rely on the opinion of the German ambassador to Tokyo? Moreover, not long before that, on May 19, Sorge conveyed that "this year the danger may be over."

The fact that Ambassador Otto drew information about the war of Germany against the USSR not from official sources from Berlin, but from the Germans who visited Tokyo, is evidenced by the encryption from Sorge on June 1, 1941. The text of the message read:

“The expectation of the start of the German-Soviet war around June 15 is based solely on the information that Lieutenant Colonel Scholl (s) brought with him from Berlin, from where he left on May 3 for Bangkok. In Bangkok, he will take the post of military attaché.

Otto said that he could not receive information on this matter (about the beginning of the Soviet-German war - A. K.) directly from Berlin, but had only Scholl's information.

In a conversation with Scholl, I found that the Germans were attracted by the fact of a great tactical mistake, which, according to Scholl, made by the USSR, in the issue of opposing the Red Army.

According to the German point of view, the fact that the USSR's defensive line is located mainly against the German lines without large branches is the greatest mistake. He will help defeat the Red Army in the first big battle. Scholl announced that the most powerful blow would be from the left flank of the German army.

Ramsay.

It hardly needs to be explained that in Moscow they could not rely on the information of a German lieutenant colonel, especially a military diplomat associated with intelligence, and in a third-rate country, and not with the development of operational and strategic plans. Nevertheless, the information attracted the attention of the Center. Sorge was asked for clarification, namely, he should have been informed:

"The essence of the big tactical error that you are reporting and your own opinion about the veracity of Scholl about the left flank is more understandable."

A Soviet intelligence resident telegraphed June 15, 1941 to the Center:

“The German courier … told the military attaché that he was convinced that the war against the USSR was being delayed, probably until the end of June. The military attaché does not know whether there will be a war or not.

I saw the beginning of a message to Germany that in the event of a German-Soviet war, it would take Japan about 6 weeks to launch an offensive into the Soviet Far East, but the Germans believe that the Japanese will take longer because it will be a war on land and sea (end phrases are distorted).

Ramsay.

The most definite was the information that Sorge sent to Moscow two days before the attack, on June 20. He reported:

“The German ambassador to Tokyo Otto told me that a war between Germany and the USSR is inevitable … German military superiority makes it possible to defeat the last large European army, just as well as it was done at the very beginning … (distortion) because the strategic defensive positions of the USSR before are still even more incapable of combat than they were in the defense of Poland.

Invest (Ozaki Hotsumi - A. K.) told me that the Japanese General Staff is already discussing the position to be taken in case of war.

Proposals for Japanese-American negotiations and issues of internal struggle between Matsuoka, on the one hand, and Hiranuma, on the other, have stalled because everyone is waiting for a solution to the question of relations between the USSR and Germany.

Ramsay.

The importance of this message cannot be underestimated, but the date of the attack, as it is mistakenly believed, was not named. It should be borne in mind that other information came from Tokyo as well. For example, Soviet intelligence intercepted a telegram from the military attaché of the French Embassy (Vichy) in Japan, who reported:

“Again there are persistent rumors about an imminent German attack on Russia. Many Japanese diplomats, known for their restraint, make it clear that some events, the consequences of which will be very important for a future war, will occur around June 20, 1941."

Here the term is indicated, but it is immediately admitted that it can be "either an attack on England, or an attack on Russia."

The famous Soviet historian Professor Vilnis Sipols, who carefully studied the various information received in Moscow on the eve of the war, comes to the conclusion: “Even by mid-June 1941 in the USSR, as in other countries, there was no accurate and sufficiently complete information about Germany's intentions. Until June 21, reports were coming in that gave grounds for hopes that the attack could still be prevented. The question arises: did not the disinformation that came to Moscow look much more weighty, more convincing than the partly correct, but incomplete, most often fragmentary and contradictory information that was collected by our bodies that obtained information about the German plans?"

However, although the exact date of the attack was not known, even on the basis of the available information, the Kremlin should have brought the troops to full combat readiness before it was done. Moreover, as an active participant in the war, General of the Army Valentin Varennikov, rightly pointed out, Stalin had warned a month before the war: "We may be subjected to a surprise attack." So questions remain …

An interesting version of events was given by the German historian F. Fabry, who, referring to the well-known TASS report of June 13, 1941, writes: the naivety of Stalin, who supposedly seriously counted on the fact that with this proof of his goodwill, to keep Hitler from hasty measures. But if you study this document in detail, you will see completely different calculations. After all, the Kremlin openly made Hitler understand that he had information about the deployment of German troops, that he had taken countermeasures, but that, if Germany wishes, he will agree to start negotiations, which, naturally, would have the sole purpose of gaining time.” The fact that Stalin was by no means naive was attested to by his enemies. For example. Goebbels wrote in his diary: "Stalin is a realist to the bone."

But back to Sorge and his exploit of a scout. As you know, after the German invasion, information about the position of Germany's ally - militaristic Japan - became critically important for the Kremlin.

After confirming the authenticity of Sorge's messages about the approaching German attack in Moscow, confidence in his resident in Japan increased. Already on June 26, he sends a radio message:

“We express our best wishes for difficult times. All of us here will persevere in our work.

Matsuoka told German Ambassador Ott that there was no doubt that after some time Japan would oppose the USSR.

Ramsay.

Although through the efforts of journalists and publicists who were trying to please Khrushchev, the main merit of Sorge was precisely the warnings about the impending treacherous attack of Hitler's Germany on the Soviet Union, in reality, his main feat was the timely opening of Japanese strategic plans and informing the Kremlin about the postponement of the Japanese attack on the USSR from summer-autumn 1941 for the spring of next year. That, as you know, allowed the Soviet high command to free part of the grouping in the Far East and Siberia to participate in the battle of Moscow, and then in the counteroffensive. But more on that next time.