Table of contents:

How capitalism was born and stabilized in the USSR
How capitalism was born and stabilized in the USSR

Video: How capitalism was born and stabilized in the USSR

Video: How capitalism was born and stabilized in the USSR
Video: Кем был атаман Ермак? Покорение Сибирской Тартарии 2024, April
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If you have ever wondered this question, then let me introduce you to the article by Maxim Lebsky, where you will find all the necessary answers.

CONTENT:

Introduction

1. The origin of capitalism in the Soviet Union

2. "Shock therapy"

3. Formation of the Russian ruling class

4. Stabilization of Russian capitalism in the 2000s.

5. Insider rent

6. "Raw materials superpower"

Conclusion

INTRODUCTION

The most popular genre of articles written by Russian leftist publicists is criticism on the topic: "The causes of the crisis of the socialist movement in Russia."

Left-wing websites are literally inundated with texts in which every step in the work of various organizations that formally advocate from a socialist position is analyzed in detail.

Very often criticism takes the natural form of the complete defeat of entire parties or individuals. The list of imputed sins is very long: ignorance, laziness, petty bourgeoisness, venality, etc., etc.

Most often, all criticism boils down to conclusions about the incapacity of the left movement in Russia, consisting of "bad and illiterate activists." In our opinion, well-reasoned criticism and self-criticism is a useful and important thing, since domestic left-wing activists, indeed, do not know much and are not able to.

But a reasonable question arises, is such a crisis state of the socialist movement in Russia caused by the negative qualities of individuals who cannot build strong organizations?

Is it possible that in the 27 years that have passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, “right people” have not emerged, capable of putting the left movement on its feet?

Contemporaries are often inclined to endow their era with some unique properties: “We are going through the most difficult time”; “We have the worst youth,” and so on. By avoiding such patterns, it is important for us to understand the specifics of our society. Russian socialists tend to often scold each other, rarely trying to ponder over the objective reasons for the incapacity of the socialist movement in our country.

In order to understand the causes of the crisis, we must answer the key question: how did modern Russian capitalism arise and develop?

The left movement is a mirror reflecting the development trends of the capitalist system. In this regard, understanding the specifics of Russian capitalism is the key to understanding the true causes of the crisis of the anti-capitalist and workers' movement in our country.

1. THE RISE OF CAPITALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION

In the minds of many people, there is a myth that capitalism in Russia arose from scratch, “falling from the sky” in 1991. Below in the text, we will try to refute this mythologeme on the basis of figures.

It is impossible to understand modern Russian capitalism if one does not take into account the fact that the centers of capitalist relations began to develop already in late Soviet society. It is not just about the economy, but also about the cultural background. In a sense, in the late Soviet Union, bourgeois consciousness arose before the rise of the big bourgeois class itself.

The ideological basis for the creation of the Soviet version of the consumer society was laid in the third program of the CPSU, adopted in 1961. Researcher B. Kagarlitsky writes about this program as follows:

"After all, “communism” is presented there exclusively in the form of a consumer's paradise, a kind of giant American supermarket, from where every citizen can freely and free of charge carry everything that satisfies his “continuously growing needs”. The cult of consumption, built into a system oriented towards a continuous increase in production, was supposed to stabilize it, give it new incentives, but in fact, it was decomposing it. " [1].

As a result of a kind of social contract on the absence of the expansion of civil rights in exchange for a continuous increase in living standards, in the Soviet Union in the 1970s. arose consumer society … The bourgeoisization of the consciousness of the Soviet citizen became a powerful ideological prerequisite for the emergence of capitalist society in Russia. But the point is that the matter was not limited to ideological prerequisites.

Even before the formal beginning of perestroika, the shadow sector was present in the Soviet Union within the framework of the state economy. It began to take shape actively back in the 1960s. in the wake of the emerging shortage of some consumer goods and the "monetary overhang" 2].

The main stronghold of the shadow sector were Transcaucasian republics and Central Asiawhere the shadow workers were already directly controlled by the local nomenclature 3] … Demonstrative repressions against the party leadership of the republican communist parties did not eliminate the system of corruption, which took deep roots in all spheres of government.

The actors changed, but the system of corruption ties within the party and economic bureaucracy continued to exist and actively develop.

The production of the means of production was under the complete control of the state, but the shadow economy occupied a fairly serious position in the trade in consumer goods.

Foreign researcher Gregory Grossman estimates the share of the shadow economy in the USSR's GDP at the end of the 1970s. in 7-8% [4] … Economist A. Menshikov writes that the share of the shadow economy in the second half of the 1980s. had to 15-20 %Gdp 5] … G. Khanin writes about the participation of tens of millions of people in the shadow economy 6].

But along with the traditional black market, which existed on the basis of a shortage of consumer goods, there was an administrative sector of the shadow economy in the USSR. Its essence is characterized by G. Yavlinsky:

"The state plan could not be 100% real, could not provide for all the details and inevitable, often unexpected changes. Hence the need for independent activity of managers-managers arose to solve the tasks assigned to them.

It is possible to conduct a lengthy discussion on whether it was possible to preserve a unified state based on the market, but the fact is that there were serious disagreements in the nomenclature on the eve of perestroika on at least one of the first of the above issues.

At the initial stage of reforms, we can distinguish three factions within the nomenclature.

First factionwas represented by conservatives, who strove with all their might to prolong the Brezhnev era, after the death of Leonid Ilyich himself.

Second faction- modernizers of the planned economy, who advocated reforms without changing the socio-economic basis of the USSR.

Third faction- radical reformers striving to create a full-fledged market system in the USSR. The fact is that we can clearly distinguish the above-named factions after the fact, knowing all the events that have taken place. During Perestroika itself, for a long time there was a hidden war between various apparatchiks, who used the common terminology of the official ideology.

The political confrontation after 1988 polarized the CPSU into two camps - "Conservatives"and "Democrats" … The main question was how far market reforms would go. E. Ligachev(secretary of the CPSU Central Committee for ideology) was the leader of the so-called. "Conservatives" striving to keep the USSR on the rails of a planned economy.

"Democrats" represented by B. Yeltsin (first secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU) and A. Yakovleva (head of the propaganda department and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee for ideology, information and culture), took a confident course towards the complete restoration of capitalism in the USSR.

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Seeing this alignment of forces, Gorbachev tried to maneuver and take a centrist position, but in the face of an aggravating internal crisis, there were no prerequisites for creating a strong center in the political system of the USSR. As T. Kraus rightly notes:

"Gorbachev always tried to occupy a central position both in the party and in the country, but there was no longer any "center". He distanced himself from the "nostalgic" communists, while being at the same time at knives with the "democrats" " [10].

The defeat of the "conservatives" in the internal party struggle was not accidental. They did not have a coherent program of social change., on the basis of which they could consolidate Soviet society.

Ligachev, being Gorbachev's ally in perestroika, proposed to gradually reform the economy, keeping all the levers of power in the hands of the CPSU. Such good wishes clearly lost out to the strength and organization of the radical reformers, who fought for complete change in the socio-economic basis of the countryseeking to become a part of world ruling class.

It is unlikely that they wanted the country's collapse: its economic space could provide the domestic bourgeoisie with good starting positions on the world market. Just the objective course of events pushed the republican factions of the nomenclature seize property and power fasterin the conditions of the rapidly growing disintegration of the USSR.

We will not consider step by step the entire perestroika, but will focus on several decisions that prepared the way for the transformation of Russia into a capitalist semi-periphery. The version that the Soviet economy by 1985 was in complete stagnation does not correspond to the facts.

Nevertheless, there was a certain crisis tendency in it - a continuous decline in economic growth rates since the end of the eighth five-year plan (1966-1970).

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Table # 1 11]

According to official Soviet statistics, the growth rates of social labor productivity also began to decline after the eighth five-year plan:

1961-1965 - 6, 1 %,

1966-1970 - 6, 8 % (average annual indicators), 1971-1975 - 4, 5 %,

1976-1980 - 3, 3 %,

1981-1985 - 3, 1 % [12].

As G. Khanin notes:

"Objectively assessing the state of the Soviet economy in the mid-1980s, we can conclude that there were real opportunities to overcome the stagnation and impending economic crisis. But this required, relying on the strengths of the Soviet economy, on the basis of an objective economic analysis and assessment of the state of society, to develop a well-thought-out plan for overcoming the crisis. " [13].

It is important to note the emergence of the dependence of the Soviet economy on the export of hydrocarbons. The key date that determined the gradual integration of the USSR into the world market was 1973. As a result of the OPEC decision, which imposed an embargo on oil supplies to countries supporting Israel, the price of a barrel of oil jumped from $ 3 to $ 12.

In 1979, in connection with the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, the price of oil rose from $ 14 to $ 32. The leaders of the USSR decided to take advantage of the conjuncture on the oil market and steel increase the export of oil and oil products abroad.

In 1970 the USSRexported 95.8 million tons of oil and oil products. Of them:

petroleum products - 29.0 million tons

raw oil - 66.8 million tons.

1980 year- 160.3 million tons. Of them:

petroleum products - 41.3 million tons

raw oil - 119 million tons.

1986 year - 186.8 million tons. Of them:

petroleum products - 56.8 million tons

crude oil - 130 million tons 14].

From these numbers, we see an increase in the gap between the export of oil and oil products:

1970 gap 2 times,

in 1980 - 3 times.

The percentage of fuel and electricity exports in total exports is increasing

With 15, 6 % in 1970 to 52, 7 % in 1985 [15]

In connection with a sharp jump in oil prices and an increase in oil exports, the USSR budget began to receive huge flow of petrodollars:

1970 - 1.05 billion dollars,

1975 - $ 3.72 billion,

1980 - $ 15.74 billion [16].

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The increase in hydrocarbon exports has become the "Life-saving decision" which the Brezhnev leadership seized on. Discovery of huge oil and gas reserves in Western Siberia in the 1960s.and the jump in oil prices in the 1970s. allowed the ruling nomenclature to abandon the development of systemic reforms that would imply the introduction of automated management, a sharp increase in labor productivity, the development of energy-saving and science-intensive technologies.

This was a direct consequence of the degeneration of the top of the CPSU. She no longer had a strategic vision of the country's future, but tried by any means to delay the urgent reforms. Member of the Central Committee of the CPSU in the 1980s. G. Arbatov recalled:

"It (export of energy resources - ML) saw salvation from all troubles. Is it really necessary to develop your science and technology, if whole factories can be ordered abroad on a turnkey basis?Is it really so necessary to radically and quickly solve the food problem if tens of millions of tons of grain, followed by considerable quantities of meat, butter and other products, are so easy buy in America, Canada, Western Europe?

In the early 1990s. the most important financial operations in the state were entrusted to "authorized" banks ("Menatep", "Inkombank", "ONEXIM"), which were created on the basis of Komsomol centers and cooperatives … They acted as financial centers through which reallocated capitalthereby preparing the privatization fixed assets in the mining and manufacturing industries … Kryshtanovskaya writes:

"So, during the period of latent privatization, the largest banks and concerns were created and part of industrial enterprises were privatized. All this was in the hands of the class of delegates. The power of the party-state nomenklatura was exchanged for property. The state, in fact, privatized itself, and the results were used by "privatizers" - government officials " [49].

In the 1980s. we can talk about the oncoming movement of two social forces 50], on the basis of which a new ruling class will arise:

1) bottom- on behalf of young cooperators and members of the Komsomol;

And here we are getting to the key point that determined death of the USSRthis is the desire to restore capitalism on the part of the top Soviet leadership, which was supposed to convert power into property, i.e. transform from a nomenklatura into a full-fledged bourgeoisie.

There were different factions at the top of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, but the one that aspired to breaking the planned economy in the shortest possible time … As a result, the aforementioned steps (the law on state enterprises, the law on cooperation and a number of others) undermined the centralized planning system of the Soviet Union, leading it to political and economic death.

Perestroika, as a series of reforms, had an economic orientation that fundamentally contradicted the entire historical logic of the existence of the Soviet Union

It would not be a mistake to call perestroika a Kosygin reform that took place 20 years later. 51] … In the 1960s. Soviet reformers did not set themselves such cardinal goals as the Gorbachev team, but their plans, like the actions of the architects of perestroika, were aimed at increasing the economic motivation of an individual enterprise entity by giving it the opportunity to relatively freely dispose of part of its profits.

The stake on the development of individual economic entities destroyed the unity of the Soviet national economic complex, which could develop only when all its elements performed a large and single nationwide plan … Setting profit and cost as the main criteria for the effective operation of an enterprise turned Soviet factories into semi-market firms, which over time began to be considered their competitors in other enterprises. 52].

Manufacturers began to purposefully inflate the cost of their products, focusing on the production of expensive goods. This led to a shortage of cheap consumer goods, which became unprofitable to produce. Economist K. A. Khubiev in 1990 asked the question:

"How could you not have foreseen that an increase in gross value (in monetary circulation) indicators would lead to a Samoyed economy? " [53]

The leadership of the USSR did not foresee this, which is good evidence of the deep political and intellectual degradationparty and state nomenclature. During the Gorbachev period, the process of degradation reached its limit - the Soviet leadership, with its own hands, moved the economy from crisis to catastrophe.

The State Enterprise Law strengthened the economic autonomy of individual enterprises, which inevitably led to increased inflation … Thus, in its original orientation, the restructuring led to the breakdown of the planned economy and the emergence of a market.

Summing up the first part of our article, we can say with confidence that capitalism began to mature actively in the Soviet economy with the beginning of the processes of perestroika.

We are talking about strengthening the positions of the shadow sector, weakening state control over enterprises, which led to financial speculation, parasitism of cooperators in state industry, enrichment of the director corps and the beginning of latent privatization under the guise of creating concerns.

Capital was formed from the above sources, due to which the future oligarchs would buy up Soviet factories during the period of privatization. Capitalism in the post-Soviet space did not emerge "by chance" in 1991; its appearance was purposefully prepared by a part of the leadership of the CPSU, focused on the restoration of capitalism in the USSR. As economist S. Menshikov writes:

"So, using the well-known Marxist formulation, which arose, however, for a completely different reason, capitalist relations matured in the depths of the state-socialist society " [54].

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