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German soldiers about the Soviet. 1941 through the eyes of the Germans
German soldiers about the Soviet. 1941 through the eyes of the Germans

Video: German soldiers about the Soviet. 1941 through the eyes of the Germans

Video: German soldiers about the Soviet. 1941 through the eyes of the Germans
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What was our soldier in the eyes of the enemy - the German soldiers? What did the beginning of the war look like from other people's trenches? Quite eloquent answers to these questions can be found in a book whose author can hardly be accused of distorting the facts.

This is “1941 through the eyes of the Germans. Birch crosses instead of iron crosses”by the English historian Robert Kershaw, which was recently published in Russia. The book consists almost entirely of the memoirs of German soldiers and officers, their letters home and entries in their personal diaries.

During the attack, we stumbled upon a light Russian T-26 tank, we immediately snapped it right out of 37-millimeter paper. When we began to approach, a Russian leaned out of the hatch of the tower and opened fire at us with a pistol. It soon became clear that he was without legs, they were torn off to him when the tank was knocked out. And, despite this, he fired at us with a pistol!

Anti-tank gunner

We took almost no prisoners, because the Russians always fought to the last soldier. They didn't give up. Their hardening cannot be compared with ours …

Tankman of Army Group "Center"

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After a successful breakthrough of the border defense, the 3rd Battalion of the 18th Infantry Regiment of Army Group Center, numbering 800 people, was fired upon by a unit of 5 soldiers. “I didn’t expect anything like this,” battalion commander Major Neuhof confessed to his battalion doctor. "It's sheer suicide to attack the battalion's forces with five fighters."

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On the Eastern Front, I met people who can be called a special race. The very first attack turned into a life-and-death battle.

Tankman of the 12th Panzer Division Hans Becker

You just can't believe it until you see it with your own eyes. Red Army soldiers, even burning alive, continued to shoot from blazing houses.

7th Panzer Division officer

The quality level of Soviet pilots is much higher than expected … The fierce resistance, its massive nature, does not correspond to our initial assumptions.

Major General Hoffmann von Waldau

I have never seen anyone more angry than these Russians. Real chain dogs! You never know what to expect from them. And where do they only get tanks and everything else ?!

One of the soldiers of Army Group Center

The behavior of the Russians, even in the first battle, was strikingly different from the behavior of the Poles and allies, who were defeated on the Western Front. Even when they found themselves in the encirclement, the Russians staunchly defended themselves.

General Gunther Blumentritt, Chief of Staff of the 4th Army

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June 21 evening

Non-commissioned officer Helmut Kolakowski recalls: "Late in the evening our platoon was gathered in the barns and announced:" Tomorrow we have to enter the battle against world Bolshevism. " Personally, I was just amazed, it was like snow on the head, but what about the non-aggression pact between Germany and Russia? All the time I remembered that issue of Deutsche Wohenschau, which I saw at home and in which it was reported about the concluded contract. I could not even imagine how we would go to war against the Soviet Union. " The Fuhrer's order caused surprise and bewilderment among the rank and file. “We can say we were dumbfounded by what we heard,” admitted Lothar Fromm, a spotter officer. “All of us, I emphasize, were amazed and not ready for such a thing.” But bewilderment was immediately replaced by the relief of getting rid of the incomprehensible and painful waiting on the eastern borders of Germany. Experienced soldiers, who had already captured almost all of Europe, began to discuss when the campaign against the USSR would end. The words of Benno Zeiser, who was then still studying to be a military driver, reflect the general sentiment: “All this will end in just three weeks, we were told, others were more careful in their forecasts - they believed that in 2-3 months. There was one who thought that this would last a whole year, but we laughed at him: “How much did it take to get rid of the Poles? And with France? Have you forgotten?"

But not everyone was so optimistic. Erich Mende, Chief Lieutenant of the 8th Silesian Infantry Division, recalls a conversation with his superior that took place during these last peaceful moments. “My commander was twice my age, and he already had to fight the Russians near Narva in 1917, when he was in the rank of lieutenant. "Here, in these endless expanses, we will find our death, like Napoleon," - he did not hide his pessimism … Mende, remember this hour, it marks the end of the former Germany."

At 3 hours 15 minutes, the advanced German units crossed the border of the USSR. Anti-tank gunner Johann Danzer recalls: “On the very first day, as soon as we went into the attack, one of ours shot himself from his own weapon. Clutching the rifle between his knees, he inserted the barrel into his mouth and pulled the trigger. This is how the war and all the horrors associated with it ended for him."

June 22, Brest

The capture of the Brest Fortress was entrusted to the 45th Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht, numbering 17 thousand personnel. The garrison of the fortress is about 8 thousand. In the first hours of the battle, reports were poured about the successful advance of German troops and reports of the capture of bridges and fortress structures. At 4:42 a.m. "50 people were taken prisoners, all in one underwear, the war found them in their bunks." But already by 10:50 the tone of military documents had changed: "The battle for the capture of the fortress is fierce - numerous losses." 2 battalion commanders have already died, 1 company commander, the commander of one of the regiments was seriously wounded.

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“Soon, somewhere between 5.30 and 7.30 in the morning, it became finally clear that the Russians were fighting desperately behind our front lines. Their infantry, supported by 35-40 tanks and armored vehicles, found themselves on the territory of the fortress, formed several centers of defense. Enemy snipers fired aimed fire from behind trees, from roofs and basements, which caused heavy losses among officers and junior commanders."

“Where the Russians were knocked out or smoked out, new forces soon emerged. They crawled out of basements, houses, from sewers and other temporary shelters, fired aimed fire, and our losses grew steadily."

The summary of the Wehrmacht High Command (OKW) for June 22 reported: "It seems that the enemy, after the initial confusion, is beginning to put up more and more stubborn resistance." OKW Chief of Staff Halder agrees with this: "After the initial" tetanus "caused by the suddenness of the attack, the enemy moved on to active operations."

For the soldiers of the 45th division of the Wehrmacht, the beginning of the war turned out to be completely bleak: 21 officers and 290 non-commissioned officers (sergeants), not counting the soldiers, died on its very first day. In the first day of fighting in Russia, the division lost almost as many soldiers and officers as in all six weeks of the French campaign.

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Boilers

The most successful actions of the Wehrmacht troops were the operation to encircle and defeat the Soviet divisions in "cauldrons" in 1941. In the largest of them - Kiev, Minsk, Vyazemsky - Soviet troops lost hundreds of thousands of soldiers and officers. But what price did the Wehrmacht pay for this?

General Gunther Blumentritt, Chief of Staff of the 4th Army: “The behavior of the Russians, even in the first battle, was strikingly different from the behavior of the Poles and allies who were defeated on the Western Front. Even when they found themselves in the encirclement, the Russians staunchly defended themselves."

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The author of the book writes: “The experience of the Polish and Western campaigns suggested that the success of a blitzkrieg strategy lies in taking advantage of more skillful maneuvering. Even leaving resources behind brackets, the enemy's fighting spirit and will to resist will inevitably be crushed under the pressure of enormous and senseless losses. This logically follows the mass surrender of demoralized soldiers who were surrounded by them. In Russia, however, these "elementary" truths were turned upside down by the desperate, sometimes fanatic, resistance of the Russians in seemingly hopeless situations. That is why half of the offensive potential of the Germans was spent not on advancing towards the set goal, but on consolidating the already existing successes."

The commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Fyodor von Bock, during the operation to destroy Soviet troops in the Smolensk "cauldron" wrote about their attempts to break out of the encirclement: "A very significant success for the enemy who received such a crushing blow!" The encirclement ring was not solid. Two days later, von Bock lamented: "So far it has not been possible to close the gap in the eastern section of the Smolensk boiler." That night, about 5 Soviet divisions managed to get out of the encirclement. Three more divisions broke through the next day.

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The level of German losses is evidenced by the message from the headquarters of the 7th Panzer Division that only 118 tanks remained in the ranks. 166 vehicles were damaged (although 96 were subject to repair). The 2nd company of the 1st battalion of the "Great Germany" regiment, in just 5 days of fighting to hold the line of the Smolensk "cauldron", lost 40 people with a regular number of 176 soldiers and officers in the company.

The perception of the war with the Soviet Union among ordinary German soldiers gradually changed. The unbridled optimism of the first days of the fighting gave way to the realization that "something is going wrong." Then came indifference and apathy. The opinion of one of the German officers: “These huge distances frighten and demoralize the soldiers. Plains, plains, they never end and never will. This is what drives you crazy."

Constant concern was brought to the troops by the actions of the partisans, whose number grew as the "cauldrons" were destroyed. If at first their number and activity were negligible, then after the end of the fighting in the Kiev "cauldron" the number of partisans in the sector of Army Group South increased significantly. In the sector of Army Group Center, they took control of 45% of the territories occupied by the Germans.

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The campaign, which lasted for a long time with the destruction of the encircled Soviet troops, evoked more and more associations with Napoleon's army and fears of the Russian winter. One of the soldiers of Army Group "Center" on August 20 lamented: "The losses are terrible, can not be compared with those that were in France." His company, starting from 23 July, took part in the battles for the "tank highway number 1". “Today is our road, tomorrow the Russians will take it, then again we, and so on.” The victory no longer seemed so close. On the contrary, the enemy's desperate resistance undermined the morale and inspired by no means optimistic thoughts. “I have never seen anyone more angry than these Russians. Real chain dogs! You never know what to expect from them. And where do they only get tanks and everything else ?!"

During the first months of the campaign, the combat effectiveness of the tank units of Army Group Center was seriously undermined. By September 41st, 30% of the tanks were destroyed, and 23% of the vehicles were under repair. Almost half of all the tank divisions envisaged for participation in Operation Typhoon had only a third of the initial number of combat-ready vehicles. By September 15, 1941, Army Group Center had a total of 1,346 combat-ready tanks, up from 2,609 at the start of the campaign in Russia.

The loss of personnel was no less severe. By the beginning of the offensive on Moscow, German units had lost about a third of their officers. The total losses in manpower by this time reached about half a million people, which is equivalent to the loss of 30 divisions. If we take into account that only 64% of the total composition of the infantry division, that is, 10,840 people, were directly "fighters", and the remaining 36% were logistic and auxiliary services, it becomes clear that the combat effectiveness of the German troops has decreased even more.

This is how one of the German soldiers assessed the situation on the Eastern Front: “Russia, only bad news comes from here, and we still don't know anything about you. And in the meantime you are absorbing us, dissolving in your inhospitable viscous expanses."

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About Russian soldiers

The initial idea of the population of Russia was determined by the German ideology of the time, which considered the Slavs "subhuman". However, the experience of the first battles made adjustments to these ideas.

Major General Hoffmann von Waldau, Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe Command, 9 days after the start of the war, wrote in his diary: "The quality level of Soviet pilots is much higher than expected … Fierce resistance, its massive nature does not correspond to our initial assumptions." This was confirmed by the first air rams. Kershaw quotes one Luftwaffe colonel: "Soviet pilots are fatalists, they fight to the end without any hope of victory or even survival." It is worth noting that on the first day of the war with the Soviet Union, the Luftwaffe lost up to 300 aircraft. Never before had the German Air Force suffered such large one-time losses.

In Germany, the radio shouted that the shells "not only set fire to German tanks, but pierced through and through Russian vehicles." But the soldiers told each other about Russian tanks, which could not be pierced even with point-blank shots - the shells ricocheted from the armor. Lieutenant Helmut Ritgen of the 6th Panzer Division admitted that in a collision with new and unknown Russian tanks: “… the very concept of waging a tank war has radically changed, the KV vehicles marked a completely different level of weapons, armor protection and tank weight. German tanks instantly went over to the category of exclusively anti-personnel weapons … "Tankman of the 12th Panzer Division Hans Becker:" On the Eastern Front I met people who can be called a special race. The very first attack turned into a life-and-death battle”.

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An anti-tank gunner recalls what an indelible impression on him and his comrades made by the desperate resistance of the Russians in the first hours of the war: “During the attack, we came across a light Russian T-26 tank, we immediately snapped it right out of 37-millimeter paper. When we began to approach, a Russian leaned out of the hatch of the tower and opened fire at us with a pistol. It soon became clear that he was without legs, they were torn off to him when the tank was knocked out. And, in spite of this, he fired at us with a pistol!"

The author of the book “1941 through the eyes of the Germans” quotes the words of an officer who served in a tank unit in the sector of Army Group Center, who shared his opinion with the war correspondent Curizio Malaparte: “He reasoned like a soldier, avoiding epithets and metaphors, limiting himself only to argumentation, directly related to the issues under discussion. “We hardly took any prisoners, because the Russians always fought to the last soldier. They didn't give up. Their hardening cannot be compared with ours …"

The following episodes also made a depressing impression on the advancing troops: after a successful breakthrough of the border defense, the 3rd battalion of the 18th Infantry Regiment of Army Group Center, numbering 800 people, was fired upon by a unit of 5 soldiers. “I didn’t expect anything like this,” battalion commander Major Neuhof confessed to his battalion doctor. "It's sheer suicide to attack the battalion's forces with five fighters."

In mid-November 1941, an infantry officer of the 7th Panzer Division, when his unit stormed into Russian-defended positions in a village near the Lama River, described the resistance of the Red Army. “You just can't believe it until you see it with your own eyes. The soldiers of the Red Army, even burning alive, continued to shoot from the burning houses."

Winter of the 41st

In the German troops, the saying quickly came into use: "Better three French campaigns than one Russian." "Here we lacked comfortable French beds and the monotony of the terrain was striking." "The prospect of being in Leningrad turned into an endless sitting in numbered trenches."

The high losses of the Wehrmacht, the lack of winter uniforms and the unpreparedness of German equipment for combat operations in the conditions of the Russian winter gradually allowed the Soviet troops to seize the initiative. Over the three-week period from November 15 to December 5, 1941, the Russian Air Force flew 15,840 sorties, while the Luftwaffe only 3500, which further demoralized the enemy.

Lance corporal Fritz Siegel wrote in his letter home on December 6: “My God, what are these Russians planning to do with us? It would be nice if up there at least listened to us, otherwise we all have to die here."

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